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ABSTRACT
The influence of ideology and attitudes on the decision-making process of
Supreme Court justices has been well documented, such that the attitudinal model has
emerged as the dominant paradigm for understanding judicial behavior. When ideology
and personal preferences seem to eclipse legal factors, such as adherence to
precedent and deference to the democratically-elected branches, outcries of “judicial
activism” have occurred. Previous studies (Lindquist and Cross 2009) have
operationalized judicial activism and have provided measures for studying behavior that
may be considered activist (as opposed to restrainist), further supporting the premise
that ideology trumps other extra-attitudinal and legal factors in the judicial decisionmaking process.
While the attitudinal model indicates that ideology is the strongest predictor of
judicial decision-making, this research will include a number of legal variables that have
significantly influenced justices‟ votes. As previous studies have demonstrated, an
integrated model that combines a number of critical variables can have more
explanatory power than one that relies on attitudinal reasons alone (Banks 1999;
Hurwitz and Stefko 2004; Mishler and Sheehan 1996). As such, the purpose of this
research is to examine individual level decision-making of the most ideological justices
on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (1969-2004) in regards to their activist behavior to
overrule legal precedents and invalidate federal statutes. This research will employ
multivariate regression analysis to assess the effects of attitudinal, legal and extraattitudinal factors in the judicial decision-making process.
ii
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Theoretical Grounding
Throughout American history, the U.S. Supreme Court‟s constitutional role has
been to serve as a neutral arbiter of the law. From the public‟s perspective, this entails
the High Court‟s following of existing legal precedents and limiting its actions that could
be interpreted as usurping powers that reside with the democratically-elected branches
(i.e., overturning statutes, limiting the power of the president). Although the nine
unelected, essentially life-tenured justices cloak themselves in black robes representing
their political disinterest, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court is a policy-making
institution (Baird 2008; Posner 2008; Pritchett 1948; Schwartz 1992; Segal and Spaeth
2002). The role of the High Court as a policy-making institution is quite controversial, as
normative arguments suggest it is undemocratic for unelected officials to wield such
significant power. At the same time, others argue that, “the rationale traditionally
advanced for investing substantial political power in an unelected Court is the protection
of minorities from democratic excess” (Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1) as it is inherently
a counter-majoritarian institution (Bickel 1962).
Members of Congress, the media, and the public alike echo alarm over the
growing trend that is referred to by the ambiguous catch-all, “judicial activism.” “For the
most part, those who decry activist decisions focus on the judiciary‟s usurpation of
political power from the elected branches, especially when judges render those
decisions in accordance with their own policy preferences” (Lindquist and Cross 2009,
1). In fact, a 2005 American Bar Association survey found that 56% of Americans are
1

concerned that judicial activism has become a crisis (Neil 2005). Although some
political scientists have successfully operationalized and measured judicial activism
(Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1996), generally
the term is invoked when one is ideologically opposed to the Court‟s decision.
“Everyone thinks that those who do not share his substantive views should be
restrained” (Easterbrook 2002, 2). Furthermore, ideological labels such as
“conservative” or “liberal” dominate the public debate regarding judicial activism,
transforming an institution that was once the alleged bastion of impartiality to a partisan
body capable of delivering a perceived political decision such as Bush v. Gore (2000).
Undoubtedly, the role of the Supreme Court has changed over time: the
expansion of the types of legal questions that the prevailing Court addresses and the
evolution of its decision-making process allows the justices several opportunities to
inject their personal preferences along the way, creating long-lasting policy implications
for the nation (Pritchett 1949; Schubert 1964; 1965). The litigious nature of American
society has caused a dramatic expansion of the courts generally to areas of American
life that were previously regarded as “private” (Carp and Rowland 1983, 5). These
uncharted territories are blank slates
guidelines

free from the limits of precedent or legislative

and allow broad discretion for judges to rely on their personal values and

political goals for decision-making (Carp and Rowland 1983).
However, despite its changing agenda, the public expects the Supreme Court to
maintain some semblance of objectivity while interpreting the law, or else our American
value of professing “justice for all” loses meaning. Lacking both “the purse and the
2

sword” (Hamilton 1788), the Court must consider the public‟s perceptions of it as a
neutral and disinterested entity in order to maintain its authority and legitimacy so its
decisions have some effect (Barnum 1985; Caldeira 1986; Lindquist and Cross 2009;
Mishler and Sheehan 1993). “The lack of any formal connection to the electorate and
its rather demonstrable vulnerability before the president and Congress mean that the
United States Supreme Court must depend to an extraordinary extent on the
confidence, or at least the acquiescence, of the public” (Caldeira 1986, 1209). Hence,
the American ideal of “justice for all” becomes threatened when the public perceives its
neutral arbiters acting in a manner that is not neutral. Accordingly, Caldeira (1986)
found that instances of increased judicial activism (allowing attitudes and personal goals
to dictate decisions) resulted in a decrease of the public‟s confidence in the Court,
thereby threatening its legitimacy.
Judicial activism has garnered intense public debate, even though it is a rather
subjective term with little consensus concerning its very meaning (Easterbrook 2002).
Nonetheless, this contentious topic must be defined and measured if we are to
understand the decision-making process of Supreme Court justices. For the purposes
of this study, judicial activism will be measured by two variables: namely, precedence
conformance and judicial review of federal statutes. Previous studies (Lindquist and
Cross 2009) have included the judicial review of state and local laws or executive
branch actions in their measures of judicial activism, yet those measures are excluded
from the scope of this study, as the focus lies on the interactions with the federal
branches of government and their potential influence over the Supreme Court.
3

While recognizing the merits that the attitudinal model has provided for
strengthening our understanding of judicial decision-making, this research posits that
the attitudinal model is too simplistic to account for the multi-dimensionality and
complexities that characterize justices‟ behavior. Ideology may be the dominant
motivator for a justice‟s vote to overrule precedent or invalidate a federal statute, but it
seems naïve to suggest that legal and extra-attitudinal factors are not relevant at all. As
such, this study will rely on an integrated model, incorporating a number of legal and
extra-attitudinal variables, in addition to ideology, in order to understand the complexity
and strategies of a justice‟s individual decision-making.
This research will examine the individual votes cast by the most ideological
justices who served during the Burger (1969-1985) and Rehnquist Courts (1986-2004)
that resulted in the overruling of precedent or invalidation of a federal statute in order to
determine which legal, extra-attitudinal and attitudinal factors are significant in
influencing judicial decision-making. By studying the most ideological justices who
served on these two Courts (1969-2004), this research is able to assess the effects of
the political environment, specifically, if the presence of unified or divided government or
the party of the president constrains judicial decision-making. For example, using a
separation of powers model, this research will gauge the degree to which the presence
of a conservative president and majority in Congress might affect the relative likelihood
of an ideologically conservative justice‟s acting to invalidate federal statutes and
overrule legal precedents, and vice versa.
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By focusing on the most ideologically extreme justices of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, this study hopes to isolate the effect of ideology and examine the
impact of legal and extra-attitudinal factors. Evidence gained from previous studies
would allow us to presume that they are likely to manifest activist behavior, as the bulk
of literature (Bonneau, Hammond, Maltzman and Wahlbeck 2007; Brenner and Stier
1996; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Hurwitz and Stefko 2004;) indicates that the most
ideological justices are more likely than median justices to exhibit so-called activist
tendencies in their decision-making. For example, in regards to the invalidation of
federal statutes, Hagle and Spaeth state: “To the extent that the Court accepts cases to
reverse them, we might expect significantly different reversal rates for those justices
whose voting patterns are more ideologically extreme” (1993, 495). Thus, by focusing
on the justices of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, this study seeks to determine which
legal and extra-attitudinal factors are statistically significant in influencing the behavior
of some of the most ideological justices and their centrist counterparts.
Relevancy of This Research
Alexander Hamilton attempted to reassure American citizens that the newlycreated judiciary, as detailed in Article III of the Constitution, was “the least dangerous
branch” (Hamilton, 1788, 437) of the nascent government. He envisioned a Court that
was insulated from the political whims of the legislature and the public so that the
justices could interpret laws in a manner that was unbiased and in accordance with
legal principles that have withstood the tests of time. Surely, he never expected that the
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Supreme Court would become the policy-making entity that it is today; yet it is difficult to
argue against this notion, as ample evidence exists to support it (Baird 2004; Lindquist
and Cross 2009; Schubert 1965; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002).
Anyone who has ever witnessed a Supreme Court confirmation hearing can
attest to the ideologically-motivated questioning and personal attacks by senators
through which they attempt to gauge the candidate‟s fit for one of the highest positions
in the nation. Furthermore, nominees are expected to divulge their personal views on
major issues in the same way that senators and representatives do on the campaign
trail. The confirmation process is a sort of faux-town-hall meeting, in which the Senate
and the public determine whether a Supreme Court nominee‟s liberal or conservative
leanings will result in the desired policy outcomes. For example, during the last three
decades, nominees were questioned as to their personal beliefs on abortion so as to
determine if a new member on the bench could sway the vote in order to uphold Roe or
further chip away at it (Banks 1999). The attitudinal model, which views the Court as a
policy-making institution whose members rely on personal policy goals in their decisionmaking, would predict that a change in membership could result in a change in law (or
rather, policy).
During one of the most controversial periods of our nation‟s history, Chief Justice
Earl Warren (1953-1968) presided over the Supreme Court and set in part the political
course for our nation, expanding civil rights and liberties in an unprecedented manner.
The Warren Court is often regarded as the most activist Court (Bickel 1962; Hart 1959),
a moniker resulting from a number of decisions rendered during Warren‟s tenure that
6

promoted social change, generally at the expense of the Southern way of life. The
controversial Warren Court rulings have been criticized for eschewing previous legal
precedents and for creating new legal rights in accordance with personal policy
preferences. For example, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)i is regarded as an example
of “judicial lawlessness” (e.g., Bork 1990) as the decision presumably created privacy
rights that are not rooted in any legal grounding. Similarly, the landmark decision in
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)ii reversed the precedent that Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896) set, thereby ending federally sanctioned segregation in public schools in the form
of “separate but equal” laws.iii The unanimous decision overturned the precedent set in
Plessy, but relied on the Fourteenth Amendment‟s guarantee of equality before the law.
Of course social norms change over time and with the norms so does the law
and the interpretation of that law - which is how, in 1896, the declaration of separate but
equal was constitutional in Plessy v. Ferguson, but in 1954, separate was declared to
be inherently unequal in Brown v. Board. Despite the criticism, the Warren Court cases
have withstood the test of time. “Many of the most significant of these decisions remain
intact, suggesting that, despite the frequent criticism, efforts to undermine the Court‟s
standing „brought no literal change or damage to the Court or its rulings‟” (Lindquist and
Cross 2009 as quoting Wicker 2002, 6).
The liberal decisions of the Warren Court have certainly lent credence to the
attitudinal theory that justices view policy problems in accordance with their personal
policy preferences. Because of the Warren Court‟s obvious liberal leanings, judicial
activism has often been associated as a liberal phenomenon, incapable of being
7

associated with conservative justices. However, with membership change resulting in a
conservative majority on the Rehnquist Court, conservative justices may be just as likely
as liberal justices to rely on personal preferences when interpreting the law (Lindquist
and Cross 2009).
The Rehnquist Court may empirically be the conservative equivalent of the liberal
Warren Court in regards to activist decision-making (Kerr 2003; Sunstein 2001). The
Rehnquist Court‟s willingness to invalidate congressional enactments under the
Commerce Clause or the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments may indicate judicial
activism by conservative justices (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 8). Furthermore, although
Justice Scalia purports that his judicial philosophy relies on a “strict constructivist”
interpretation of the law, he has been known to ignore plain meaning or inconsistently
interpret the intent of the Eleventh Amendment to suit his political preferences (Cohen
2005).iv
The courts have become another arena for the political parties to battle out their
ideological differences. According to Pritchett (1968, 486), “The major development in
public law since 1948 has been the shift of attention from the Court as enunciator of
legal doctrine to the Court as instrument for the resolution of political conflict.” Supreme
Court confirmation hearings have become as politicized as elections, as senators prod
nominees for their personal views on a range of issues, knowing that because of
essentially lifetime tenure of federal judges and increasing life expectancy, justices are
able to shape policy that will have broad implications for several generations of
Americans. In this sense, Supreme Court justices are essentially politicians who are not
8

directly accountable to any constituents, nor are they concerned with reelection
campaigns. Freed from these constraints, and also because they generally do not seek
a higher office, Supreme Court justices are able to pursue their political goals
unencumbered. Their only challenge is to juggle the delicate balance between
interpreting the law in accordance with legal principles, known as the legal model, and
interpreting the law as close as possible to their ideal policy goals, known as the
attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth 2003).
This research intends to contribute to the ongoing debate between proponents of
the attitudinal model and those of the legal and integrated models. While the attitudinal
model has demonstrated that ideology is the strongest predictor of judicial decisionmaking, this research will also include a number of legal variables that have proven to
significantly influence justices‟ votes. As previous studies have demonstrated, an
integrated model that combines a number of critical variables has more explanatory
power than one that relies on attitudes alone (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004; Mishler and
Sheehan 1996). “While we largely agree that attitudinal influences explain the greatest
proportion of variance concerning justices‟ votes on the merits, particularly when
horizontal stare decisis is at issue, it seems to us that a model of Supreme Court
decision-making can incorporate critical variables in addition to those based on attitudes
and thus become even more explanatory” (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004, 122). Hence, an
integrated model that incorporates attitudinal, legal and extra-legal factors will be used
in order to provide a thorough understanding of the complexities involved in the judicial
decision-making process. While the attitudinal model is a strong predictor of judicial
9

behavior on its own, it is believed that a much more nuanced understanding can be
achieved by using an integrated model. To separate this study from the bulk of
literature that exists on the subject of judicial decision-making, this study will employ
multivariate regression incorporating a number of attitudinal, extra-attitudinal and legal
variables in an integrated model.
Literature Review
Borrowing from Ancient Rome, a traditional idea of justice is based on a
disinterested, impartial judge who is blind to subjective interests; hence, our image of
Lady Justice who wears a cloth over her eyes and objectively weighs the scales of
justice. This traditional model of judicial decision-making was accepted until the early
1900s when the Legal Realists emerged and began to doubt the tenets of the legal
model. “The nineteenth century stereotype of the Court as a body of aloof, bearded
gentlemen in black robes who did not make law but merely discovered it by processes
too mysterious for laymen to understand was already dissolving in the cynical acid of
the twentieth century” (Pritchett 1968, 486). The Legal Realist movement was an
attempt to understand and reconcile a judiciary whose behavior could no longer be
explained by the legal model. As Pritchett (1968, 488) states: “A primary task for public
law since 1948, then, has been [the] development of a theory of democratic government
and judicial review, and a corresponding frame of reference for research, which would
accommodate the participation of an activist court in the making of public policy.”
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Like other schools of thought based on realist theory, the Legal Realists focused
on more self-interested motivations (namely attitudes, and social, economic and political
values) to explain judicial decision-making. Ever since the early realists (such as
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes) sought to explain international relations, the
reigning theoretical notion explaining human behavior suggests that humans are selfish
and seek to maximize their own interests. As such, meshing together several schools
of thought, including “pragmatism, behavioral psychology, psychoanalysis and statistical
sociology,” the Legal Realists began to realize the influence of extra-legal factors upon
the justices‟ decisions (Pritchett 1968, 487).
By the 1930s, political scientists began empirically researching and testing
theories pertaining to judicial decision-making (Schubert 1964, 1975), and arrived at the
judicial behavioral approach. Simply put, “The judicial behavioral approach represents
the fusion of theories and methods developed in various social sciences in order to
attempt to study scientifically how and why judges make the decisions they do”
(Schubert 1964, 3). It could be said that the major rift between the traditional legal
formalists and the proponents of the judicial behavior model was a response to the
reorganization of the Court under President Franklin D. Roosevelt as it became
apparent that policy preferences were clearly influencing the Court‟s decisions (Pritchett
1968). The Roosevelt Court demonstrated its propensity to inject ideology and attitudes
into its decisions (Pritchett 1968), often striking down restrictive state policies that
infringed on individual freedoms. The controversial debate concerning the role of the
Court was ubiquitous, evidenced by the “classic dialogue between Justices Black and
11

Frankfurter, representing the contrasting positions of judicial activism and judicial
restraint,” (Pritchett 1968, 488) on the bench, and among political scientists and elites
who were divided along ideological lines: those who believed that the Constitution is a
living document, and those who believed that it is static and unchanging.
More recently, political scientists have largely accepted the attitudinal model as
the dominant model for explaining judicial behavior. An abundance of research (Baird
2004; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Mishler and Sheehan 1996; Lindquist and Cross 2009;
Pritchett 1968; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002; 2003) has successfully demonstrated the
influence of extra-legal factors (namely, justices‟ policy preferences and ideology) in the
decision-making process. “Segal and Spaeth verified overwhelming evidence that
justices are not influenced by precedents with which they had disagreed, a critical
aspect of the legal model. Rather, they found that attitudinal explanations were much
more consistent with respect to this type of judicial behavior” (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004,
122). As such, the attitudinal model has prevailed as the dominant paradigm for
explaining judicial behavior.
Although the attitudinal model is the current dominant paradigm in explaining
judicial behavior, some researchers (Banks 1999; Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson
2002; Mishler and Sheehan 1996) suggest that a one-variable model is much too
simplistic to truly account for the many factors that influence a justice‟s decision-making.
After all, the Court may be insulated, but it is not isolated. Instead, it depends on the
executive branch in order to enforce its decisions, the public in order to maintain its
legitimacy, and Congress, which manages the Court‟s jurisdiction and budget. Hence,
12

while ideology may be a dominant factor in judicial decision-making, surely it is not the
only factor that influences justices‟ votes.
Role Theory
Similar to the above-mentioned paradigms, role theory is often utilized as a
framework to understand judicial decision-making. The behavioral theory supporting
the utility of role theory as an analytical construct is that at least some portion of an
actor‟s behavior is attributable to his or her role perceptions (Kitchin 1978). Kitchin
defines role as “a patterned sequence of learned actions or deeds performed by a
person in an interaction situation” (1978, 22). Furthermore, the general assumption
among behavioralists is that humans attempt to maximize their utility.v Utility is often
correlated to desire or want; hence in order to maximize utility, an actor will seek to
attain his or her preferences or policy outcomes. As such, according to policy-based
models of judicial decision-making, Howard and Segal (2004, 132) suggest that
because of a lack of electoral accountability and a lack of ambition for higher office,
justices will seek to maximize their desired outcomes by placing their policy goals at the
forefront of their decision-making process. In most political situations, there is a fair or
balanced competitive equilibrium, although surely some actors have certain advantages
over others occasionally. However, Supreme Court justices are able to operate in a
competition-free context because of the aforementioned advantages of no electoral
accountability, little ambition for higher office, and essentially life-tenure, allowing them
to maximize utility with very little relative effort.
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Kitchin (1978), who studied federal district judges, found that judges generally
orient themselves to two purposive roles: the first role, which he refers to as process
orientation, encompasses those judges who perceive their role as managing the
caseload, focusing on the trial process itself, and operating an efficient, respected court.
The second role is termed result oriented and is characterized by judges who see their
jobs as deciding matters fairly, imposing justice, and legitimately resolving conflicts.
Justices who tend toward activist decision-making are likely to fall into the latter
category. “Earl Warren was said to be the „paradigm of the result-oriented judge‟ who
used his judicial authority to promote his own personal view of social justice” (Lindquist
and Cross 2009, 4). In Warren‟s attempts to create social justice, he may have
confused what is fair with what may be legally correct by focusing on the outcome and
how to arrive at that outcome. As such, role theory obfuscates that line between resultoriented decision-making and outright ideological activism. On the one hand, a justice
may vote one way because it is legally the “right” thing to do; on the other hand, the
vote might be purely political and based on personal preferences so that the desired
outcome is achieved.
In addition to the result-oriented justices, other policy-based models consider
other responsibilities that a justice might find more appropriate; for example, a
deference to public officials or a focus on restrainist behavior. “Supreme Court justices‟
attitudes and policy goals may be constrained by beliefs of what is normatively
appropriate, such as deference to the other branches of government, and particularly in
constitutional cases, deference to the positions espoused by the Solicitor General of the
14

United States” (Howard and Segal 2004, 133). In other words, an individual justice
might follow a personal conviction to defer to the wishes of Congress or the president,
despite his or her own personal ideology and political goals.
Likewise, Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson (2002) use role theory to explain
how and why judges use legal factors to advance their policy goals. In their study
including appellate judges, they suggest that a policy-oriented judge is likely to defer to
precedent because it improves the accuracy of guidelines that are communicated to the
lower courts. The basic idea is that a line of cases develops a legal principle better than
any one individual case could. For example, the idea of due process is vague and
offers little meaning on its own. However, a string of cases that follow precedent could
shape policy by giving meaning to these inherently vague phrases (2002, 757). Hence,
deference to precedent can shape policy while also maintaining a sense of stability in
the law, protecting the status quo, which in itself is a valued policy goal (2002, 756).
Furthermore, a judge may follow precedent because the judge wants his or her own
precedents to be upheld. The narcissist judge cites to other cases because he hopes
that other judges will cite to his. Last, some policy-oriented judges will follow precedent
because it protects the institutional power and legitimacy of the judiciary (Buena de
Mesquita and Stephenson 2002). The public expects that precedents will be followed,
as that is the most obvious proof of judges acting as neutral arbiters of the law.
There is ample empirical evidence to support the presence of result-oriented
decision-making on the Supreme Court (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Spaeth
1996; 2002). Furthermore, role theory may help to address variance in ideological
15

voting. For example, there is an array of ideologies present on the Court at any given
time, yet unanimous decisions are capable of being reached. This could be the result of
a justice‟s philosophy that his or her role encourages unanimous decisions to show the
Court‟s cohesion on a controversial case. Chief Justice Warren is often considered the
ultimate “result-oriented” justice, as he often encouraged unanimity despite a difference
of policy views among the justices, in order to give greater authority to decisions that the
public may have derided (Lindquist and Cross 2009), such as Brown v. Board of
Education (O‟Brien 2008).
Hurwitz and Stefko (2004) analyze justices‟ precedent conformance using role
theory to suggest that justices experience an “acclimation effect.” They find evidence
demonstrating that newcomers to the bench follow a dynamic process of acclimation
and that precedent conformance is a function of tenure. Their findings confirmed their
hypotheses that “votes for precedent dramatically abate as justices‟ tenures grow, while
preference votes amplify with increasing tenure” (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004, 125).
The Norm of Stare Decisis and Adherence to Precedents
The justices who served during the Nineteenth Century responded to the need to
increase the legitimacy and authority of the Supreme Court‟s decisions by strengthening
the norm of stare decisis (Fowler and Jeon 2008). This need arose from the
constitutional structuring of the Court that created an institution with little enforcement
power and no accountability to the nation. In this sense, the Court‟s decisions have
been referred to as “paper tigers,” (Caldeira 1986) representing nothing more than a
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mere suggestion by the Court‟s justices with no enforcement to actually implement their
guidelines. By following the legal principle of stare decisis, the justices locate their
decisions within a network of neutral legal opinions. In other words, the norm of stare
decisis represents a decision-making process that is unbiased or unaffected by the
justices‟ personal values and accords with the law. In this sense, justices arrive at the
so-called correct decision because it is clear to the public that the law required it.
Fowler and Jeon (2008) demonstrate that the norm of stare decisis was in full
effect by about 1900. Since then, the justices have perpetuated this norm by writing
opinions that cite precedent in order to demonstrate that their decisions are consistent
with existing legal principles (Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Furthermore, legal
precedents are central in guiding lower court behavior and for ensuring that lower courts
act within the constraints of the judicial hierarchical structure (Buena de Mesquita and
Stephenson 2002; Carp and Rowland 1983). Lower courts must act in accordance with
the guidelines set by the Supreme Court, as the High Court has the power to reverse
lower court decisions and will do so in order to maintain uniformity of legal interpretation
throughout the judiciary (Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002; Carp and Rowland
1983).
Precedent is one tool that the Supreme Court can use to communicate its legal
views within the judicial hierarchy. In this sense, Supreme Court justices create longlasting policy by adhering to and strengthening existing precedents in order to structure
future behavior within the lower courts. “It is not the case that policy-oriented judges
ignore precedent, nor is it the case that judges care about precedent instead of, or in
17

addition to, caring about policy. Rather, judges care about precedent because they
care about policy” (Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002, 755). Although the norm
of stare decisis has persisted as an institutional tool to protect the legitimacy of the
Court and to maintain uniformity throughout the judiciary, there are extra-legal factors
that influence judicial decision-making.
Since the publication of Pritchett‟s The Roosevelt Court (1948), and Schubert‟s
seminal works, The Judicial Mind (1965) and The Judicial Mind Revisited (1974), the
suggestion that a judge‟s votes could be explained by his or her political views and
values has gained increasing scholarly acceptance in further explaining judicial
decision-making. Schubert (1964; 1965; 1974) suggested that Supreme Court justices‟
behavior is influenced in part by their personal values and preferences as opposed to
purely legal factors, and that they rely on extra-legal factors while interpreting the law.
Since then, Segal and Spaeth (1993; 1996; 2002) have further developed the attitudinal
model that the justices‟ political preferences influence their decision-making to some
extent. In testing the influence of precedent, these authors examine justices who
initially dissented in a landmark case, then compare those justices‟ future votes in
progeny cases in order to determine if the justices‟ votes changed from their initial
revealed preference. In this sense, the justices‟ preferences are estimated and can be
compared to their votes.
The authors found that 90.8% of the votes conform to the justices‟ revealed
preferences, and only 9.2% of the time did a justice switch to the position that
established precedent supported. Furthermore, only two justices (Potter Stewart and
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Lewis Powell) showed any systematic adherence to stare decisis (Segal and Spaeth
1996). These results suggest that the influence of precedent is rather weak. Similarly,
a measure of attitudes seems more reliable in predicting justices‟ votes than are legal
factors, as empirical evidence demonstrates that justices are not solely swayed by legal
factors such as precedent. Additionally, the finding that only two justices showed any
systematic reliance on precedent implies that the norm of stare decisis has declined in
power considerably.
Even after retesting and modifying Segal and Spaeth‟s (1996) model to account
for perceived measurement errors, many political scientists have found substantial
evidence to support the attitudinal model. Brenner and Stier (1996) retested the
attitudinal model, examining the four moderate justices of the Warren Court, believing
that the centrist justices are most likely to adhere to precedent in that they are not as
ideological as the justices found at each pole. Brenner and Stier (1996, 1042) were
unsatisfied methodologically with Segal and Spaeth‟s (1996) attitudinal model, arguing
that it “either inflated the preference category or deflated the precedent category.” To
elaborate, Brenner and Stier (1996) assert that Segal and Spaeth misclassify some of
the justices‟ votes, resulting in an inflation for the preference category and a deflation for
the precedent category. They argue that the coding that Segal and Spaeth employed
did not take into account the direction of the justices‟ decisions and, thus, skewed the
results. For example, Segal and Spaeth classify justices‟ votes in favor of preference if
the justice authored or joined the majority opinion that accepted the precedent in the
progeny cases. Brenner and Stier argue that these votes should be classified as “both
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in favor of preference and in favor of precedent” (1996, 1039) and that this leads to an
inflation of the preference category.
Furthermore, Brenner and Stier chose to include memo and per curiam cases
that Segal and Spaeth excluded from their analysis. Segal and Spaeth contend that
these cases would substantially swell the progeny sample and should be excluded in
order to assure decisional parity between precedents and progeny (Segal and Spaeth
1996). Thus, they chose to exclude per curiam cases and memosvi to maintain a sense
of uniformity between what they coded as precedent and its future progeny cases. Per
curiam cases are brief decisions rendered by the Court, generally to ensure that the
lower court decision accords with the law and, as such, they do not create progeny
(Brenner and Stier 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996). Even still, Brenner and Stier‟s
results do not show any evidence of the systematic adherence to precedents among
moderate judges. Overall, they find that the justices followed the established precedent
less than half of the time (47%), with a range from a high of 73% for Justice Clark, to a
low of 27% for Justice Harlan (Brenner and Stier 1996). Surely 47% may seem high to
some, indicating that precedent is, in fact, a significant influence for justices in their
voting patterns. On the other hand, some might suggest that the justices are merely
flipping a coin, with a roughly equal chance that the case will be decided by either legal
precedent or personal ideology. Hence, the basic premise of the attitudinal model
(namely that justices‟ votes are an extension of their policy preferences and attitudes,
and not purely legal factors) gains considerable support.
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Likewise, Songer and Lindquist (1996) argue that the attitudinal model is “too
blunt to capture the subtle interactions” (1052) of the choice continuum between
precedent and preference. Because of the uniqueness of the Supreme Court and its
power to handpick the cases that it decides, there is an overrepresentation of cases
selected for review that will inevitably result in the expansion of precedent, as the Court
chooses cases in which the underlying precedent may be in conflict and those that
represent compelling and divisive questions of the day. “Therefore, in most of the
progeny cases, the justices had the opportunity to vote in a manner consistent with their
preferences without clearly repudiating precedent” (1996, 1050).
Surely, the act of overruling precedent is comparatively rare, and there are
institutional benefits to adhering to precedent, including: protecting the legitimacy of the
Court, setting guidelines that structure the behavior of lower courts, maintaining public
support and influencing policy. Yet the true power of the attitudinal model is being able
to explain and predict when and why justices vote to overrule precedent or invalidate a
statute. Simply put, the attitudinal model explains that those votes were influenced by
the justices‟ ideology and personal policy preferences as opposed to (or perhaps in
addition to) established precedent or other purely legal factors (Baird 2008; Lindquist
and Cross 2009; Schubert 1964; Segal and Spaeth 2003).
Since conservative and liberal justices both have a vested interest in maintaining
the legitimacy and authority of their institution, it would seem that there should be little
variance between ideology and precedent conformance. Thus, both conservative and
liberal justices have an interest in preserving the legitimacy of their institution, so we
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should expect that justices‟ contrasting ideologies should follow precedent at similar
rates. However, many prior studies (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Schubert 1965; 1974;
Schwartz 1992; Segal and Cover 1989; Segal, Epstein, Cameron and Spaeth 1995;
Spriggs and Hansford 2001) have suggested that the distance between a justice‟s ideal
policy point and that of the precedent is significant in influencing a justice‟s decision to
overrule the precedent. For example, one study found that a one-unit increase in
ideological distance between the median justice in the majority of the earlier cases and
the median justice of the year of the overruling decision increases the case‟s likelihood
of being overruled by 4.4% (Spriggs and Hansford 2001). Accordingly, it would seem
that those justices at each pole of the ideological continuum will be the most likely to
vote to overrule established precedent by the simple fact that their ideological distance
from a precedent is likely to be greater than that of a median justice. Thus, the greater
the ideological distance is between the precedent and the judge‟s ideal policy outcome,
the greater the likelihood that a justice will vote in a way that will ensure a decision as
close to his or her ideal point

even if that means overruling established legal

precedent.
Similarly, ideological distance also significantly influences justices‟ votes to
invalidate federal statutes (Lindquist and Cross 2009). Simply put, the most ideologically
divergent justices may be the most fervent in overruling precedent and invalidating
statutes. This point highlights the importance of the Court‟s agenda, as the types of
cases that dominate the agenda will shape policy. Thus, since the Supreme Court is
largely unique in that it sets its own agenda, the ideology of the Court is likely to shape
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the agenda according to the specific policy areas that it wishes to address and effect
change in and, as such, the decisions will follow those agenda cues (Baird 2004, 2007;
Mishler and Sheehan 1996).
Judicial Review of Federal Statutes
The general argument opposing a Supreme Court that “legislates from the
bench” is based on the premise that an unelected judiciary should take a deferential
stance towards legislation or agency regulations that have been passed by elected
officials or “more qualified appointees” so as to promote democratic influence (Posner
2008). However, although Posner (2008, 857) states that, “Judges decide cases
entirely on the basis of their biases,” he is careful to point out that there is a tradeoff that
exists in that “review by biased judges can counter legislative bias, forcing legislatures
to enact fairer and more socially beneficial statutes than they would otherwise; but
review by biased judges also raises legislative bargaining costs, thereby blocking some
desirable statutes that would otherwise be enacted.” Hence, Posner implies that the
checks and balances system inherent in our government‟s structure is functional. The
judiciary is expected to review the legislature‟s behavior to ensure that the benefits and
the costs are evenly distributed throughout society, so that one majority power does not
benefit at the cost of the other (Posner 2008). The two-party system that characterizes
American politics perpetuates this cycle of fairness “as long as the parties exchange
power frequently enough” (Posner 2008, 861). As such, according to Posner (2008),
judicial review is essential for ensuring that the legislature fairly distributes costs and
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benefits throughout society. However, Posner implies by his trade-off theory that
judicial decision-making is obviously influenced by ideology.
Not everyone finds solace in Posner‟s trade-off theory, and instead view the
Court‟s declaration of laws as unconstitutional as a troubling practice and the most
controversial aspect of so-called judicial activism (Howard and Segal 2004; Lindquist
and Cross 2009). Not only does the act of judicial review circumvent the democratic
process, but it may also impose a chilling effect on Congress. While Posner interprets
this as a beneficial result of the checks and balance system, others argue that an
activist judiciary has the ability to alter Congress‟ behavior and influence the type of
legislation that is passed (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Rogers and Vanberg 2007).
Marbury v. Madison (1803) was the first example of the Supreme Court‟s ruling
an act of Congress as unconstitutional, thus creating the power of judicial review and
officially granting itself the last word. Despite ample criticism of the creation of the
power of judicial review and the general consensus that the Courts should defer to the
will of the democratic majority, “few argue that the Court should lack this capability…[as]
judicial review remains at the heart of the Court‟s ability to protect the interests of
unpopular minorities” (Howard and Segal 2004, 131).
Nonetheless, since the Supreme Court has the last word in the U.S. legal
system, a normative argument suggests that countering the wishes of elected officials is
contrary to the principles of democracy (Commanger 1943; Howard and Segal 2004).
Furthermore, “the exercise of judicial review under the existing Constitution provides the
Court with impressive institutional authority to inject itself into the policy-making process
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by striking laws as unconstitutional. For that reason, a consensus has emerged that the
benchmark measure of judicial activism should be the invalidation of federal legislation”
(Lindquist and Cross 2009, 134).
Despite all of the concerns of a crisis, most empirical evidence suggests that the
Court is quite reluctant to strike down federal statutes (Howard and Segal 2004;
Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Spaeth 1993). While Segal and Spaeth (1993)
found that justices use their power of judicial review quite sparingly, they also found that
when they do strike down a federal statute, it is generally ideologically motivated. Thus,
their evidence suggests that liberals strike down laws that infringe on individual liberties,
while conservatives are more likely to strike down laws that limit business interests
(Segal and Spaeth 1993). Similarly, Lindquist and Cross (2009) isolate the ideological
effect in order to determine what proportion of votes to strike down federal statutes is
politically motivated. Like Segal and Spaeth, these researchers find evidence to
support the claim that the Supreme Court‟s decisions to strike down statutes are driven
by personal policy preferences (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 58). However, they also find
that there is great variation among the individual justices and the likelihood that they will
vote to invalidate a federal statute.vii Perhaps this variation is due to the justices‟
perceived roles, as role theory dictates that some justices may be more deferential to
the elected branches, despite their ideology. This will be discussed further in the next
section.
Howard and Segal (2004) review the propensity of justices to invalidate both
federal and state laws and find that “ideological considerations predominate in the
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decision to strike down” laws (138). Although the justices rely on their power of judicial
review in very few circumstances, those circumstances are likely tied to ideology. Their
research strategy relied on the number of requests for judicial review, the party
requesting judicial review and the number of times the Court struck down the law. Their
overall findings suggest that the Court is reluctant to exercise its power of judicial
review, with only 21% of all requests for certiorari being granted and only 10% of those
actually resulting in an invalidation of the law. Furthermore, they find that the Court
generally will not strike a law unless a request is made.
One surprising finding for the authors was that there were more requests from
liberal litigants than their were from conservative litigants (159 vs. 89) during an era of
conservative control over the Court. Overall, their findings show that “several
conservative and liberal justices condition their activism and restraint on the ideological
position of the party that requests judicial review, while the pooled model showed the
entire Court conditions judicial review on ideology and the perceived ideological position
of the Solicitor General” (Howard and Segal 2004, 142).
Furthermore, it is important to note that a position of deference does not exist for
state laws in the manner that it does for federal laws, as all of the justices were more
likely to strike down state laws, including Justice O‟Connor, a self-pronounced states‟
rights advocate (Howard and Segal 2004, 137). There are several reasons that explain
why state laws are more likely to be invalidated than are federal laws. First, there are
different rules regulating the judicial review of state and federal laws, under which
federal laws are subject to strict scrutiny a very stringent test that requires a
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compelling governmental interest that outweighs constitutional concerns in invalidating
the law. Second, the Supreme Court is the Court of last resort and is positioned at the
top of the judicial hierarchy. As such, it is obliged to make sure that the laws of the land
are in accord with the Supreme Court‟s decisions and that there are no great disparities
across the judicial circuits, as well as to ensure that state laws do not violate federal
laws or constitutional rights. For example, recent years have seen several video game
laws passed by state legislatures struck down as the laws infringe on the First
Amendment.viii The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear a caseix pertaining to a
California law restricting the sale of video games that has been overruled by the
Northern District of California and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Last,
Lindquist and Cross (2009, 48-49) suggest that state laws are more susceptible to
invalidation in that they are limited in their scope and do not represent the national
consensus in the manner that federal laws arguably do. As such, the invalidation of a
state law is not derided as a counter-majoritarian action in the same magnitude as a
federal law is, and the state law “may be contrary to the national popular will” (Lindquist
and Cross 2009, 49).
Legal Factors
Although the attitudinal model is quite successful in explaining why justices vote
the way they do, there is ample evidence suggesting that a number of legal factors
significantly influence the likelihood of a precedent‟s or federal statute‟s being overruled.
These legal factors will be explained below: the unanimity of the decision; the presence
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of amicus briefs or support from the Solicitor General; issue type; and, the lower court
decision and direction.
It seems intuitive that unanimous decisions will have a lower tendency of being
overruled, in that they carry more authority or integrity by the breadth of their consensus
(Benesh and Reddick 2002; Spriggs and Hansford 2001). “Without unanimity,
adherence to the rule of law is difficult because the first essential of a lasting precedent
is that the court or the majority that promulgates it be fully committed to its principle”
(Banks 1999, 8). For example, Chief Justice Warren encouraged the Court‟s unanimity
in such controversial decisions, such as Brown v. Board, knowing that a break from
established precedent could cause a backlash (especially in the Southern states), but
also because a unanimous decision enhances the legitimacy of the decision (O‟Brien
2008).
Spriggs and Hansford (2001) found that a minimum winning coalition (MWC)
increases the risk of a precedent‟s being overruled by 53.6% while a unanimous
coalition decreases that risk by 46.9%. However, Banks (1999) finds that unanimity is
not a guarantee that precedent is sacrosanct: 33.3% of the overrulings in this study
were originally unanimous decisions. Clearly, consensus regarding the inviolability of
unanimous precedents is mixed; while some argue that unanimity does or does not
matter, others have found that the level of consensus does not reach statistically
significant levels (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004). Perhaps the size of the voting coalition
carries more weight when combined with other factors. For example, Spriggs and
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Hansford (2001) found that the greater the consensus and clarity of a precedent, the
less likely the precedent will be overruled.
On the other hand, dissents and previous negative interpretations are perhaps
significant in raising the risk of a precedent‟s being overruled (Banks 1999; Spriggs and
Hansford 2002). In fact, Spriggs and Hansford‟s (2002) results suggest that if a
precedent has been treated negatively in the past, it is 57.4% more likely to be
overruled. A precedent receives negative treatment if it is severely distinguished or
limited in subsequent rulings by the Court, therefore weakening its precedential value.
As Chief Justice Hughes so eloquently states, “A dissent in a court of last resort is an
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day when a later
decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the
court has been betrayed” (Banks 1999, 241).

Recognizing the cues in the form of

negative interpretations or written dissents, experienced litigators will pursue a strategy
in order to unravel a weak precedent that is incongruent with their particular interests
and those of the current Court majority (Baird 2007).
Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson (2002) also emphasize that the justices will
act within the constraints of precedents as a means for furthering their policy goals.
Because of the communication and informational value that precedents offer, justices
will use precedent in order to shape policy as close as possible to their preferences.
The underlying theory is that Justices can influence the application of the law by
deciding how to tailor its opinion.
“The basic idea is that the development of lines of cases can
communicate a legal principle better than an individual case
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could. An initial case may invoke a general phrase or
principle such as, „due process,‟ „reasonable,‟ or „compelling
interest;‟ future cases will then develop and give meaning to
these inherently vague phrases” (Bueno de Mesquita and
Stephenson 2002, 757).
Following this logic then, older precedents will be more entrenched within the legal
community, so that even when judges disagree with these rulings, they will be more
reluctant to overrule them. Similarly, when a precedent is young, it can easily be
molded and adapted to fit within the policy goals, making a break with precedent
unnecessary. Accordingly, their results suggest that precedents of intermediate age are
most vulnerable to being replaced and older precedents are only at risk when
confronted by a Court with substantially divergent preferences (Bueno de Mesquita and
Stephenson 2002). On the other hand, there are studies with completely contradictory
findings. For example, one suggests that recent precedents are more at risk (Banks
1999) and another found that the age of the precedent did not reach statistically
significant levels (Hurwitz and Stefko 2004).
Third parties and interest groups often file amicus briefs in order to signal to the
Court the important policy implications of a particular case (Baird 2004; Wahlbeck
1997). Indeed, amicus briefs serve an important function to the Court by alluding to the
saliency of a case or legal question. Wahlbeck (1997, 784) found that amicus support
“did enhance the likelihood that the Court would produce expansive legal change.” In
analyzing search and seizure cases, Wahlbeck (1997, 795) found that, “on the
occasions when the search is supported by substantial amicus support and the
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government is not supported by amici, the chance of expansive legal change is twice as
great as the benchmark.”
Evidence suggests that justices also consider issue type and issue saliency
when deciding to overrule legal precedents or invalidate statutes. Lindquist and Cross
(2009) found evidence to suggest that ideological voting may be more pronounced in
cases to overturn precedent because those cases are more ideologically salient.
Similarly, the existing literature supports the underlying theory (Banks 1999; Benesh
and Reddick 2002; Spriggs and Hansford 2001; 2002) that justices behave differently
when considering the overruling of constitutional or statutory rulings. Using Brenner and
Spaeth‟s analysis of the Rehnquist Court, Banks (1999) found that 65% of the
overrulings dealt with constitutional concerns, while only 20% were statutory. Thus, the
Supreme Court is responsive to institutional concerns in that it is more likely to adhere
to precedent if the chance of being overruled is present. Evidence that the type of case
may constrain the Court‟s actions is further proof of the significance of legal and
institutional factors.
Lower court decisions also have shown to significantly influence future judicial
decisions (Hagle 1993; Hagle and Spaeth 1993). Hagle (1993) found that “by
controlling for the direction of the lower court decision, changes in voting patterns due to
changes in the cases will not be mistaken for initial attitudinal instability” (1145).
Furthermore, Hagle and Spaeth (1993) together emphasize the importance of the lower
court decision as a controlling variable. In an examination of the Burger Court‟s
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decisions on business cases, the lower court‟s decision significantly impacted every
justice‟s decision.
Extra-Attitudinal Factors: The Political Environment and Public Opinion
Howard and Segal (2004) studied the effect of the political environment on the
judiciary, specifically if a change in the partisan control of Congress and the presidency
might result in a shift in the justices‟ preference for deference. The authors test the
separation-of-powers hypothesis in order to determine if conservative justices are more
or less likely to strike down liberal and/or conservative requests. They hypothesize that
conservative and moderate-conservative justices should be the most constrained in
their actions (i.e., showing great deference to liberal requests and the least support for
conservative requests) during the period from 1993 to 1994 when the Democrats
controlled both chambers of Congress, as well as the presidency. What they find,
however, is that there is little evidence to support the idea that the justices act
strategically in their interactions with Congress and the presidency. “All of the
conservative and moderately conservative justices actually have a greater rejection rate
of liberal requests to overturn federal laws during the purportedly constrained years than
they do during the unconstrained years” (Howard and Segal 2004, 136). Interestingly,
justices are responsive to the Solicitor General, who serves as the top attorney
representing the United States government‟s interests before the Supreme Court.
When the Solicitor General supports a request to strike, the justices were more likely to
vote to strike the law. For example, the authors found that when President Clinton‟s
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Solicitor General requested a law be struck down, the liberal justices were more likely to
adhere to that request (Howard and Segal 2004, 141). This is likely because the
Solicitor General, the U.S. attorney appointed by the president, and who likely shares
his ideological bent, is requesting the invalidation of a law that will likely result in a policy
decision that is close to the liberal justices‟ ideal point. Just as liberals in Congress will
generally support a liberal president‟s legislative agenda (Conley 2000), Howard and
Segal‟s (2004) evidence indicates that justices are also likely to be receptive to the
policy agenda of the executive branch via the Solicitor General.
Just as a president is generally more successful in passing his legislative agenda
during a period of unified government (Conley 2000), the Supreme Court may be most
effective in impacting policy when the majority of the Court and the party of the
president are the same. As mentioned above, the solicitor general, a known repeat
player in the High Court, is able to influence the subsequent behavior of Supreme Court
justices (Baird 2004; Howard and Segal 2004; Lindquist and Cross 2009). The serving
president appoints the solicitor general and the two are likely of the same ideological
bent (Carp and Rowland 1983; Wahlbeck 1997). If a conservative Court, as is the case
with the Rehnquist Court, is met with a conservative solicitor general (appointed by a
conservative president) who requests that a law be invalidated, it is almost certain that
the Court will grant the request (Howard and Segal 2004). As such, a conservative
Court could be empowered by the election of a Republican president, or a liberal Court
may be emboldened by the election of a Democrat, as each are representative of the
public mood to some extent.
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Mishler and Sheehan (1993) suggest that the Court‟s ideological composition
changes in response to shifts in the ideological orientation of the president and
Congress, independent of membership change. It is intuitive that a Court‟s ideology will
respond accordingly to changes of its membership; a newcomer to the bench may shift
the Court to the left or right on the ideological continuum because of their respective
ideology. However, there is a lack of consensus as to the influence of the president or
Congress influencing the ideological make-up of the Court. Mishler and Sheehan
(1993), however, find that Court‟s members may shape their ideology in regards to the
acting President or party control of Congress. As such, a shift in the ideological position
of the Court increases the likelihood that new policy areas may be addressed.
Furthermore, they found that the Court is responsive to public opinion both
directly and indirectly (Mishler and Sheehan, 1993). Public support of the Supreme
Court is essential to maintaining legitimacy, as the institution lacks any effective
enforcement tools and its source of authority stems solely from its reputation (Barnum
1995; Caldeira 1986; Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht 2000). Although the Court is insulated
from the public in that its members are not directly elected and have no accountability to
a constituency, empirical evidence suggests that the Court infrequently strays too far
towards a counter-majoritarian decision (Barnum, 1995; Mishler and Sheehan, 1993).
As mentioned previously, the Court is dependent on the public for its very legitimacy
because of its institutional structure. The Court‟s institutional prestige is heavily
influenced by the public‟s perceptions of the Court as a neutral entity.
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Similarly, the partisan control of Congress may affect the Court‟s actions. For
example, Harvey and Friedman (2006) assert that when the Republicans gained control
in Congress, the probability of the Court‟s striking down a liberal law rose by 47%. As
such, “the Rehnquist Court‟s willingness to strike Congressional enactments may have
been empowered or inspired by a conservative mood in the country or a conservative
Congress that was unlikely to retaliate against the Court” (Lindquist and Cross 2009,
52). Thus, the Court is sensitive to the policy views of the democratically-elected
branches. This is known broadly as a “separation of powers” model.
Furthermore, Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht (2000, 772) report that the Court‟s level
of public support is a function of “the degree to which the Court‟s ideological position
deviates from the public‟s ideological preferences.” In theory, then, the members of the
Court assess the so-called national mood by the party of the democratically-elected
president and Congress. As such, justices at the ideological extremes may feel
empowered when a president or Congress of their same ideological bent is in power
and may be more willing to overrule established precedents or invalidate federal
statutes. Furthermore, if the president has the opportunity to nominate new justices to
the bench, thus changing the ideological composition of the Court, then there may be
new formal opportunities to create policy (Mishler and Sheehan 1996).
Institutional Factors and Agenda Change
During the Rehnquist Court (1986 to 2005), the plenary docket shrunk from
around 150 cases to less than 100 cases per term, consisting of a full briefing and oral
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arguments before the Court. . According to the attitudinal model, the Supreme Court
organizes its agenda according to the ideological composition of its members and
specific policy areas in which it wishes to affect change in or create lasting policy
implications (Baird, 2008; Lindquist and Cross, 2009; Mishler and Sheehan, 1996).
According to Easterbrook (2002, 2), “these justices decide which cases to take, and
they are likely to choose those in which the call to activism is hard to resist.”
Furthermore, Mishler and Sheehan (1996) found that as the ideological center of the
Court becomes more conservative, the Court will grant certiorari to a larger number of
conservative cases and to more strongly conservative cases, or those with greater
policy implications.
Although the Court cannot formally solicit cases, Baird (2004) offers evidence to
suggest that the Court tacitly signals litigants demonstrating its willingness to hear
cases pertaining to certain policy areas or salient issues. In this sense, the Court not
only shapes its own agenda, but it is also able to choose well-crafted cases that allow it
to shape policy in those areas (Baird 2004). She finds that the Supreme Court tacitly
works together with its litigants and repeat players (such as the Solicitor General) to
signal certain policy priorities of high saliency. The litigants interpret these cues,
(namely, conflict, disagreement with lower court decisions, the presence of amicus
briefs, and support for the Solicitor General and strategic considerations of the
justices‟), and then present well-crafted cases for the justices at a time lag of
approximately five (5) years (Baird 2004, 766). A five-year time lag is hardly an
obstacle for essentially life-tenured justices who wish to make policy.
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Like other political actors, Supreme Court justices act strategically, weighing their
own vote in light of the other eight members on the bench, in order to have the most farreaching policy implications (Mishler and Sheehan 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996;
2002;). According to the Rational Choice Model (Segal and Spaeth 2002), rational
justices act strategically, considering the consequences of their own decision in light of
the others on the bench in order to maximize their utility. For example, if a justice is
weighing her decision to grant certiorari in a disfavored case in hopes of overturning the
decision, but she knows that the Court will not overturn the decision, then it would be in
her best interest to act strategically and to deny certiorari. Similarly, there are
numerous examples of justices‟ voting against their preferences in order to achieve a
unanimous decision, or upholding a well-established precedent and maintaining the
status quo, or because they realize that their preferred outcome is impossible. As such,
a change in the Court‟s ideological composition means that new voting coalitions may
be created on the Court, pushing the policy center to the left or right.
The relative ideological composition of the Court in the period that will be
examined leads to the following hypotheses: 1) the Court‟s agenda will reflect the
ideological composition of the justices themselves, in that the four votes necessary to
hear the case are comparatively easily garnered (Mishler and Sheehan 1996); and, 2)
the justices at the ideological polesx may feel empowered to address issues that they
theretofore would have ignored because they lacked the sufficient votes necessary to
overrule a precedent (Mishler and Sheehan 1996).
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Accordingly, the conservative composition of the Rehnquist Court should reflect
an agenda in which ultimately liberal precedents and statutes may be overturned,
conservative precedents will be strengthened, and conservative statutes will remain
undisturbed. Similarly, a liberal-dominated Burger Court would likely result in an
agenda in which conservative precedents and statutes are overturned, while liberal
precedents and statutes will be upheld.
Summary
Judicial decision-making is often the topic of intense debate, although the
attitudinal model has prevailed as the accepted paradigm for explaining why justices
vote the way they do. As the existing literature attests, ideology is one of the strongest
predictors of judicial behavior (Baird 2004; Howard and Segal 2004; Hurwitz and Cross
2004; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002; Spriggs and Hansford
2001). Of particular interest for the purpose of this study are the justices who served on
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts (between the years of 1969-2004) and are located at
the polar ends of the ideology continuum. The ideologically polarized justices are more
likely to behave as activists because of their disparate policy views. Furthermore, while
a great deal of literature accepts the Supreme Court as a policy-making institution with
partisan political goals, there is a lack of empirical evidence pointing to the systematic
behavior of conservative and liberal justices who exist at the ideological extremes.
Although the Supreme Court is insulated, it does not operate in a political
vacuum. As such, a number of legal, extra-legal and political variables will be employed
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in an integrated model for a more complete and accurate view into one of the most
complex institutions in our country. The next chapter will elucidate the hypotheses,
variables and theoretical groundings that are central to this study.
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CHAPTER TWO: MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Uniqueness of this Analysis
The attitudinal model, as developed by Segal and Spaeth (1993; 1996; 2002),
has served as the dominant paradigm in explaining judicial decision-making,
questioning the influence of legal factors as a predictor of justices‟ vote choice. The
attitudinal model prescribes that ideology and attitudes are sufficient to predict and
explain why Supreme Court justices vote the way they do. While the bulk of the
literature pertaining to judicial decision-making supports the predictive power of the
attitudinal model, its reliance on only one variable has earned it the nickname, “the
naïve attitudinal model” (Mishler and Sheehan 1996, 198). In reality, legal factors and
other extra-attitudinal factors have some influence over judicial decision-making (Banks
1999; Barnum 1985; Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002; Harvey and Friedman
2006; Hurwitz and Stefko 2004;Mishler and Sheehan 1996;). Unanimous decisions
provide evidence of such, as justices may consider factors beyond ideology in these
instances of unanimity. Similarly, strategic voting in accordance with the rational choice
model may motivate a justice to vote against his or her ideology in order to achieve the
desired outcome (Segal and Spaeth 2002). Furthermore, evidence suggests that
ideology may have a larger influence over more ideological justices than median
justices, who may be more likely to respond to precedent or public opinion (Brenner and
Stier 1996; Mishler and Sheehan 1996). Thus, it is evident that judicial decision-making
is much more nuanced and complex than the attitudinal model alone might suggest.
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As such, this research seeks to understand the behavior of the most ideological
justices, those who are positioned at each pole on the ideological continuum. It is of
particular theoretic interest to determine whether these justices are influenced by legal
and extra-attitudinal factors, or if ideology alone dictates their decisions. Furthermore,
this research seeks to understand the systematic differences between ideologically
conservative and liberal justices, and to determine if they respond differently to legal
and extra-attitudinal factors. To date, the bulk of the literature regarding judicial
decision-making seems to address the ongoing debate between proponents of the
attitudinal model and those of the legal model (Brenner and Stier 1996; Brisbin 1996;
Buena de Mesquita and Stephenson 2002; Knight and Epstein 1996; Mishler and
Sheehan 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996; Songer and Lindquist 1996; Spriggs and
Hansford 2001; 2002) or focuses on the median justices (Baird 2004; Brenner and Stier
1996; Bonneau, Hammond and Wahlbeck 2007; Grofman and Brazill 2002;). There is
very little evidence to increase our understanding of the differences and motivations
between ideological justices who are very conservative or liberal.
The focus of this research is centered on the most ideological justices because it
is presumed that their behavior may be characterized as the most activist and
ideologically motivated (Brenner and Stier 1996; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and
Spaeth 1996). The attitudinal model has demonstrated that the likelihood of a
precedent‟s being overturned or a federal statute‟s invalidation increases when the
ideological distance between the justice‟s ideal point and the policy outcome is the
greatest. By the simple fact that the most ideologically conservative and liberal justices
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are at opposite poles, the ideological distance is thereby likely to be greatest in cases
that request the invalidation of a statute or address a precedent‟s longevity. The
attitudinal model dictates that ideology is the driving factor behind judicial decisionmaking, so it is of particular interest to determine if legal factors or extra-attitudinal
factors influence decision-making for these ideological justices. By isolating and
examining the most ideological justices, this research intends to determine the extraattitudinal and legal factors that influence decision-making beyond ideology alone.
Data and Methods
The period of analysis for the purposes of this research will be the Burger (19691986) and Rehnquist (1986-2005) Courts. These two Courts allow a logical
juxtaposition of an ideologically liberal and conservative Court and provide a more
balanced sample of extreme ideologues than would the examination of only one of
these Courts. Nineteen justices served during the period examined, and six of these
may be characterized as extreme ideologues.xi
The most ideological justices were determined using Martin and Quinn Scores
(2002), providing an ideological measure for each justice for each term that they served
on the Supreme Court. These scores are derived using votes on the merits of a case
that were collected from the United States Supreme Court Database and they place
each justice along the ideological continuum. The Martin and Quinn (2002) scores are
methodologically superior to previous ideological scores that have been developed, in
that they: 1) are based on actual behavior (as opposed to news editorials, such as the
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Segal and Cover (1989) propose); 2) are dynamic, allowing longitudinal comparisons;
and 3) have demonstrated high correlations for a number of legal issues, not simply
those concerning cases regarding civil liberties and civil rights votes (2002, 13).
Furthermore, they have demonstrated a higher correlation than the Segal and Cover
(1989) scores (Martin and Quinn 2002, 13). The scale ranges from -6.656 (extremely
liberal, as demonstrated by Justice Douglas) to 3.884 (extremely conservative, as
demonstrated by Justice Thomas).
Using the Martin and Quinn Scores (2002), the ideology scores of each justice
for the years 1969 through 2004 were recorded, as well as the calculated mean and
standard deviation values. For the purposes of this study, the most ideological justices
are defined as those justices who are more than one standard deviation away from the
policy mean for each Court term. These justices are: Douglas, Brennan, Rehnquist,
Marshall, Stevens and Thomas. These six justices‟ votes for each Court term that they
were identified as an ideologue will serve as the unit of analysis in this examination of
judicial behavior.
This study will employ multivariate regression. Regression analysis is the
preferred method for examining the influence of several independent variables, as it
isolates “the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable, while
controlling for the effects of other independent variables” (Pollock 2009, 187). Thus, we
can examine the effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable while
holding the other variables constant. Furthermore, multiple regression helps to detect
spurious relationships that may interfere with the analysis.
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Two dependent variables will serve as measures of judicial activism for the focus
of this study. First, the overruling of legal precedent serves as one of the dependent
variable, as precedent is one of the most easily understood and observable legal
factors. Thus, when justices decide cases according to previous legal precedent, it is
obvious that they are following the law and, thus, are serving as neutral arbiters of the
law. However, when a precedent is overruled, however rare that may be, claims of
judicial activism are made and the legitimacy of the decision is sometimes called into
question. “The most visible and dramatic instance of interpretative instability comes
when the Court explicitly overrules one of its own earlier decisions” (Canon 1983, 241).
This study will utilize data from the U.S. Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005) in
order to determine which justices‟ votes resulted in the alteration of precedent or the
invalidation of a federal statute. Precedent conformance will be measured by justices‟
votes that resulted in the alteration of precedent for cases that were orally argued
before the Court during the 1969 through 2004 terms. Votes are coded as 0 if the
justice voted for the alteration of precedent (a preference vote) and as 1 if the justice‟s
vote conformed to the precedent (a precedent vote).
The second dependent variable that has been chosen for the purposes of this
study is a measure of judicial activism measured by votes to invalidates federal statutes.
To measure the second dependent variable, I relied on data collected from the U.S.
Supreme Court Database. Accordingly, justices‟ votes that deemed an act of Congress
as unconstitutional will be coded as 1, and all votes that upheld the statute will be coded
as 0.
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A number of independent variables will be measured in order to capture the
effect of possible attitudinal, extra-attitudinal and legal factors that influence the
likelihood that a justice will vote to overrule precedent or invalidate a statute:
Ideology Scores. The Martin and Quinn scores identifying each justices‟ ideal
point along the ideology continuum will be used. The Martin and Quinn scores have a
range of -6.656 (extremely liberal, as demonstrated by Justice Douglas) to 3.884
(extremely conservative, as demonstrated by Justice Thomas).
Decision Direction. In order to account for the ideology of the case outcome, a
variable denoting the direction of the decision will be used. The decisions will be coded
using data from the U.S. Supreme Court Database so that conservative case outcomes
will be coded as 1, liberal case outcomes will be coded as 2, and those cases where a
direction can not be specified are coded as 3.
Number of Dissents. In order to account for the weight of the decision, a variable
measuring the number of dissents written by justices in the minority of the original case
will be included. The literature has not reached a consensus to date regarding the
influence of the vote split on the likelihood that a precedent is overturned, yet it seems
intuitive that unanimous decisions and those with fewer corresponding dissents are less
likely to be overturned (Banks 1999; Spriggs and Hansford 2002).
Lower Court Decision. Hagle (1993) found that “by controlling for the direction of
the lower court decision, changes in voting patterns due to changes in the cases will not
be mistaken for initial attitudinal instability” (1145). Furthermore, Hagle and Spaeth
(1993) together emphasize the importance of the lower court decision as a controlling
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variable. In an examination of the Burger Court‟s decisions in economic cases, the
lower court‟s decision was a statistically significant influence in economic decisions for
every justice‟s vote. To measure the lower court decision, this study will rely on data
from the U.S. Supreme Court Database. The variable lcdisposition specifies the
treatment of the case in issue‟s previous rulings; that is, whether the lower court
affirmed, reversed, remanded, for example, the previous decisions based on the merits
of the case (Spaeth 2005). This variable is coded 1-12 as follows: 1 – stay, motion
granted; 2 – affirmed; 3 – reversed; 4 – reversed and remanded; 5 – vacated and
remanded; 6 – affirmed and reversed in part; 7 – affirmed and reversed in part and
remanded; 8 – vacated; 9 – petition denied or appeal dismissed; 10 – modify; 11 –
remand; 12 – unusual disposition.
Lower Court Disposition Direction. This variable specifies the direction of the
lower court decision and is coded as follows: 1 – conservative; 2 – liberal; 3 –
unspecifiable.
Issue Type. Each case will be coded according to issue type in order to
determine if there is an underlying association with a justice‟s decision and to determine
if any patterns arise along ideological lines. The values of this variable are coded as
follows: 1 – Criminal Procedure; 2 – Civil Rights; 3 – First Amendment; 4 – Due
Process; 5 – Privacy; 6 – Attorneys; 7 – Unions; 8 – Economic Activity; 9 – Judicial
Power; 10 – Federalism; 11 – Interstate Relations; 12 – Federal Taxation; 13 –
Miscellaneous; 14 – Private Action.
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President’s Ideology. A continuous variable representing the president‟s
ideology will be measured using Poole‟s (1998) “common-space” scores, coded as -1
(extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative).
Congress’ Ideology. Using the Poole and Rosenthal DW-nominate scores, the
mean views of all the members of Congress will be calculated to represent the ideology
score. These scores are coded using a scale from -1 (extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely
conservative). Thus, the ideological distance between the Supreme Court and Congress
can be determined.
Divided vs. Unified Government. A dummy variable to signify the presence of
unified (the same party controls both the White House and both chambers of Congress)
or divided (one party controls the White House and another party controls either one or
both chambers of Congress) government will be employed. A unified government will
be coded as 0, and divided government will be coded as 1.
These variables will be tested via multiple regression analysis in order to
examine the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: In a comparison of Supreme Court justices who served between
1969 and 2004, those who are the most ideological (at the ideological extremes
according to the Martin and Quinn Scores (2002)) will vote to overrule established
precedents more frequently than their centrist counterparts.
Hypothesis 1b: In a comparison of Supreme Court justices who served between
1969 and 2004, those who are the most ideological (at the ideological extremes
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according to the Martin and Quinn scores (2002)) will vote to invalidate federal statutes
more frequently than their centrist counterparts.
Hypothesis 2a: The justices who are identified as the conservative ideologues
will likely overrule more liberal precedents than their conservative non-ideologue
colleagues.
Hypothesis 2b: The justices who are identified as the liberal ideologues will likely
overrule more conservative precedents than their liberal non-ideologue colleagues.
Hypothesis 3a: When the party of the president and the majority of Congress are
both aligned with the party of the majority on the Court, then the justices will be less
likely to invalidate federal statutes. (Unified Government Hypothesis)
Hypothesis 3b: When the party of the president and the majority of Congress are
NOT aligned with the party of the majority on the Court, then the justices will be more
likely to invalidate federal statutes. (Divided Government Hypothesis)
Summary
This analysis is intended to supplement previous attitudinal studies that propose
that Supreme Court justices are political beings who use their personal ideology, values,
and attitudes in order to decide questions of the law. Specifically, this study examines
the systematic behavior between the ideologues on the bench. Undoubtedly, the role of
the Court has changed as it delves into political questions that were theretofore
reserved for democratically-elected politicians. As such, political scientists may develop
a deeper understanding of the Court within a political context and determine if the
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ideological patterns of behavior that are evident in the other branches of government
are emergent on the Court as well.
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CHAPTER THREE: OVERRULING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
Findings and Analysis
The first measure of judicial activism examined for the purposes of this research
is the overruling of legal precedent. In general, a high degree of precedence
conformance represents judicial restraint in that by following established legal
precedents, justices are noticeably following the law. Simply put, “The binding nature of
precedent is seen as a constraint on judicial power and hence a limitation on activist
decision-making” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 123). Precedent bolsters predictability, in
addition to prestige and legitimacy of the High Court. As such, it is not surprising that
the Court‟s overruling of legal precedent is a rare occasion. Justices are reluctant to
overrule established precedent in order to maintain the legitimacy of the Court (Epstein
and Knight 1996; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Young 2002). “The authority of precedent
is generally thought to be one of the most important institutional characteristics of
judicial decision-making” (Young 2002, 1150).
Certainly the reluctance of justices to overrule precedent is apparent in empirical
evidence. From 1969 to 2004, spanning the tenure of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts,
the justices voted to overrule precedent in 91 cases out of a total of 4,087 that received
plenary review. Table 1 shows the percentage of cases in which precedent was
overturned for each Court term of the observed period. The data were collected from
the United States Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005), identifying cases that
resulted in the formal alteration of precedent for each court term. Votes were counted
as “for the alteration of precedent” if they are coded in the database as: 1 – voted with
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majority or plurality; 3 – regular concurrence; and 4 – special concurrence (Spaeth
2005).
Table 1 Percentage of Cases Overturning Precedent by Court Term
Court
Term

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Percentage of
Cases
Overturning
Precedent
2.2%
2.6%
1.5%
2.1%
1.4%
1.6%
4.3%
4.0%
3.1%
0.8%
2.3%
0.8%
0.7%
1.3%
2.0%
1.4%
2.7%
4.1%

Court
Term

Percentage of
Cases Overturning
Precedent

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

1.4%
4.4%
0.8%
4.5%
1.9%
0.9%
2.4%
3.4%
5.3%
0%
3.3%
1.3%
1.3%
1.3%
4.0%
1.4%
2.8%
1.4%

Accordingly, evidence suggests that the Burger Court began its tenure as fairly
activist, overruling two to three precedents per term, generally at a rate of 2%, more or
less. President Nixon appointed Burger to the Supreme Court to replace Chief Justice
Warren in 1969 with the expectation that Burger would prove to be a strict constructivist
in his judicial interpretations. Moreover, conservatives hoped that Chief Justice Burger
would overrule some of the controversial rulings of the Warren Court. However,
empirical evidence suggests that the Burger Court was not as activist as some
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conservatives may have hoped. Instead, more than half (54.35%) of the cases that
resulted in the overruling of precedent actually produced liberal decisions. Only twentyone cases (45.65%) reached a conservative outcome.
In 1975, the Burger Court appears extremely activist, overruling six precedents in
one term (4.3%), although there does not appear to be a decisive pattern or
explanation. These cases spanned a variety of issue topics, including: Criminal
Procedure, Economic Activity, the First Amendment, Federalism and Unions. Overall,
the Burger Court appeared to be the most activist, overruling precedents in cases
pertaining to Economic Activity (17) and Criminal Procedure (11). Towards the end of
Chief Justice Burger‟s tenure, again there is a rather high rate of precedents‟ being
overruled, and this pattern seems to continue into the Rehnquist Court.
Indeed, the Rehnquist Court begins its tenure clearly abandoning legal
precedent, thus prompting the indignation of Justice Marshall, “who denounced
Rehnquist‟s plurality opinion in [Payne v. Tennessee] on the grounds that the Court was
creating a novel theory of stare decisis” (Banks 1999, 1). In fact, during the 1995 Court
term, 5.3% of the cases argued before the Supreme Court resulted in the overruling of
precedent. The actual number of cases overruled in 1995 was four, but the percentage
rate for that Court term appears high because of the shrinking docket that characterized
the Rehnquist Court. Of these four cases, two were decided in the liberal direction
(pertaining to the First Amendment and judicial power) and two were decided in the
conservative direction (concerning due process and federalism). It appears that the
Rehnquist Court heed to existing legal precedent more often as its tenure increases.
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The majority of cases (38%) examined concerned Criminal Procedure and, not
surprisingly, 60% of these cases that resulted in the overruling of precedent led to a
conservative decision.
Table 1 provides some background information regarding the rate of precedence
conformance on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts in the aggregate, but the focus of this
study is on the individual justices, specifically those who are identified as extreme
ideologues. As such, I calculated the percentage of each justice‟s votes to overturn
precedent (the numerator) divided by the total number of votes (the denominator) cast
during their service on the Burger and/or Rehnquist Courts. Table 2 shows the results
for both the ideologues and the non-ideologues‟ rates of overruling precedent.
Surprisingly, comparing the mean rate of justices‟ votes to overrule precedent
shows that the mean for the ideologues (.0132) is actually lower than the mean for the
non-ideologues (.0156), suggesting that the more centrist justices vote to overrule
precedent more often than the justices who have been characterized as ideologues.
The standard error for the ideologues‟ mean rate of overruling precedents is .0012 and
the standard error for the non-ideologues‟ mean was calculated as .0007. As such, in
an infinite number of random samples of justices, .0108 represents a minimum mean
rate of precedents overruled for the ideologues, and .0170 represents a maximum mean
rate of precedents overruled for the non-ideologues. Furthermore, the standard error of
the difference between the ideologues and the non-ideologues‟ means is .0014. Using
the one-tailed test of statistical significance, the null hypothesis
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that the observed

differences in the mean rates of overruling precedent between the ideologues and the
non-ideologues occurred by chance or random sampling error

can be rejected.

Mean difference – 1.645(standard error of the difference)
.0024 – 1.645(.0014) = .0001
The p-value was determined to be .0436, so the probability value is less than .05,
indicating that the null hypothesis can safely be rejected (Pollock 2009).

Table 2 Percentage of Total Justice Votes to Overturn Precedent on the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, 1969-2004
Justice Name

Percentage of Total
Justice Votes to
Overturn Precedent
0.82%
1.07%
1.07%
1.23%
1.25%
1.39%
1.49%
1.49%
1.52%
1.56%
1.58%
1.59%
1.63%
1.63%
1.68%
1.72%
1.79%
1.79%
1.93%

William O. Douglas *
Anthony Kennedy
Potter Stewart
Thurgood Marshall *
William Brennan *
John Paul Stevens *
David Souter
Stephen Breyer
Warren Burger
Clarence Thomas *
John Marshall Harlan II
Lewis F. Powell
Byron White
Sandra Day O‟Connor
William H. Rehnquist *
Hugo Black
Antonin Scalia
Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Harry Blackmun
* = Ideologue Justices

The total mean rate for all of the justices‟ votes (ideologues and non-ideologues
alike) to overrule precedent is .0149. It is apparent that the majority of the non54

ideologue justices actually vote to overturn precedent at a greater rate than the total
mean, and certainly at a greater rate than the most ideological justices. Thomas and
Rehnquist have the highest rates of overruling precedent of the six ideologues, and
eight of the twelve non-ideologues (Justices Black, Blackmun, Ginsburg, Harlan,
O‟Connor, Powell, Scalia, and White) have a higher rate of overturning precedent than
the total mean. Accordingly, Justice Blackmun has the highest rate of overturning
precedent (1.93%) during the observed period. The evidence also demonstrates the
infrequency of which justices vote to overturn precedent, as none of the justices‟ rates
lie above the 2% line, although Justice Blackmun‟s votes come close.
These results do not support Hypothesis 1 which asserted that the ideologue
justices would vote to overrule precedent at higher rates than would the non-ideologues.
The hypothesis was based on the theory that because the ideological distance between
the justice‟s ideal point and the policy outcome of the precedent was likely largest for
the ideologue justices, more activist behavior would occur. However, these results
suggest that the agenda likely plays a larger role than originally hypothesized. Because
of the conservative nature of the Rehnquist Court, the agenda is likely comprised of
weak liberal precedents and strong conservative precedents. Thus, the conservative
justices have more opportunities to overrule liberal precedents, which could account for
such high rates of overruling precedent by non-ideologues such as Justices O‟Connor
and Scalia. Furthermore, previous evidence (Lindquist and Cross 2009) suggests that
centrist justices are more likely to cross ideological lines when voting to overrule
precedent. This could likely explain the high rates of overruling by the non-ideologues,
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as they are more likely to overrule precedents regardless of the ideological
incongruence between their ideal point and that of the precedent, whereas the
ideologues are likely to overrule precedents only when the ideological distance is great.
In order to examine the ideological influence of justices‟ voting behavior, I
calculated the proportion of cases that resulted in a liberal outcome for each justice for
his or her total votes in all cases, as well as cases that resulted in the overruling of
precedent. Hypothesis 2a theorized that the ideologue justices would have more
pronounced ideological voting behavior. Yet, the results presented in Table 3 show that
ideological patterns are evident for all of the justices, ideologues and non-ideologues
alike.xii In fact, according to Table 3, some of the non-ideologues demonstrate much
more pronounced ideological voting than the ideologues. In comparing Justices Breyer
and Brennan, it is apparent that Justice Breyer exhibits ideological voting more often.
Although Justice Breyer voted to overrule precedent less often than did Justice
Brennan, when he did, it was almost always (90%) in order to achieve a liberal
outcome. As such, these results do not substantiate the theoretical grounding of
Hypothesis 2a.
Justice White has served as a model of judicial restraint and moderation
(Lindquist and Cross 2009). The results of Table 3 bolster this characterization, as his
votes to overrule precedent do not show any specific ideological leaning. Surprisingly,
Justice Thomas also exhibits an ideologically moderate voting record to overrule
precedent, as half of his votes to overrule precedent were in the liberal direction. This
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seems completely out of character for a justice that is considered a conservative
ideologue (Cohen 2005; Lindquist and Cross 2009).

Table 3 Justices Votes to Overrule Precedent by Ideological Outcome
Justice

Blackmun
Brennan*
Breyer
Burger
Ginsburg
Harlan
Kennedy
Marshall*
O‟Connor
Powell
Rehnquist*
Scalia
Souter
Stevens*
Stewart
Thomas*
White
* = Ideologue Justices

Total Votes to
Overrule
Precedent

% Liberal Votes to
Overrule Precedent

45
36
11
32
13
3
31
36
36
32
57
22
16
33
26
14
46

51.11%
66.67%
90%
43.75%
84.62%
66.67%
41.94%
75%
22.22%
40.62%
24.56%
27.27%
75%
57.58%
65.38%
50%
50%

% of Liberal
Votes That Do
Not Alter
Precedent
50.09%
65.43%
54.45%
36.7%
55.81%
49.15%
42.66%
65.56%
40.82%
38.72%
33.04%
36.60%
55.42%
55.78%
45.85%
34.58%
45.12%

The literature overwhelmingly confirms that judicial behavior is largely driven by
personal preferences (Baird 2008; George and Epstein 1992; Hagle and Spaeth 1993;
Hurwitz and Stefko 2004; Lindquist and Cross 2009; Pritchett 1968; Schubert 1964;
Segal and Spaeth 1996; 2002); thus, the justices‟ corresponding rates of precedent
conformance must be evaluated while also considering the effects of ideology and the
agenda. As previously mentioned, substantial evidence exists suggesting that
conservative justices vote to overrule liberal precedents, while liberal justices vote to
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overturn conservative precedents (Lindquist and Cross 2009; Segal and Howard 2001).
For example, Howard and Segal (2001) found that Justices Scalia and Thomas and
Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to overrule liberal precedents twice as often as they
voted to overrule conservative precedents, yet liberal Justices Brennan, Stevens and
Souter demonstrated support that crossed ideological lines. As such, a great deal of
disparity exists between justices ideological behavior.
As such, in order to understand the various influences on the justices‟ votes, a
series of multivariate linear regression analyses were completed. A number of variables
were used in the regression analyses with data collected from the United States
Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005), the Martin and Quinn Justice Ideology scores
(Martin and Quinn 2002), as well as Poole and Rosenthal‟s (1998) common space
scores calculating the ideology scores for Congress and the Presidents for each court
term. Two regressions were estimated, the first examining the six justices who were
identified as ideologues for the purpose of this study, and the second regression
represents the 13 non-ideologue justices. The justices‟ votes for or against precedent
served as the unit of analysis, and each case within the dataset was coded to
incorporate the justices‟ ideology during that specific Court term, the president‟s
ideology score and the ideology score of Congress in the aggregate. A dummy variable
signifying divided or unified government was included along with other variables from
the United States Supreme Court Database, including: issue area, direction of decision,
lower court decision, and the number of dissents. Table 4 shows the results of the
regression analysis for the six justices characterized as ideologues (Brennan, Douglas,
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Marshall, Rehnquist, Stevens and Thomas). The adjusted R2 of .027 indicates that the
total relationship between all of the variables is rather weak

of all of the variation

among these ideologue justices‟ votes, only about 3% is explained by the independent
variables.
In regards to judicial decision-making, consensus dictates that ideology is one of
the most descriptive variables for predicting behavior. The regression coefficient for the
ideology score is -.028, indicating an inverse relationship. Accordingly, for every oneunit increase in the independent variable (as justices become more conservative),
precedence conformance decreases by .010 units. Looking at the t-ratio of -6.843, it is
apparent that the coefficient is well above the 2-or-greater rule, and we can reject the
null hypothesis. Furthermore, the significance coefficient of .000 for the justices‟
ideology score indicates that the results are statistically significant.
These findings accord with the bulk of the literature concerning judicial decisionmaking that suggests that ideology is one of the most important variables for explaining
behavior. Furthermore, the Pearson correlation coefficient describing the relationship
between the justices‟ ideology and corresponding vote is r = -1.00, indicating a negative
association. Thus, as the ideology score of the justice increases (becomes more
conservative), precedent conformance decreases. These results must be considered in
the context of the period examined, and are likely the product of the conservative
membership of the Court. During the observed period, every Supreme Court nominee
(with the exceptions of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, who were appointed by President
Clinton) was appointed by a conservative president. As such, a different court
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comprised of a more balanced or more liberal membership would certainly yield
different results. Furthermore, the docket composition and the cases reviewed certainly
sways these results as well. A conservative majority will likely shape the court‟s docket
to reflect a conservative agenda, so that weak liberal precedents are overturned and
conservative precedents are upheld.
Table 4: Regression Analysis of Ideologue Justices to Overrule Precedents
Variable

Constant
Justices‟
Ideology
Lower court‟s
decision
direction
Lower court
decision
Issue area
Direction of the
decision

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
2.003
.100
-.028
.004

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.114

t
20.055
-6.843

Sig.
.000
.000**

.000

.032

.000

.013

.990

.008

.008

.015

1.030

.303

-.033
-.117

.004
.032

-.113
-.057

-7.516
-3.668

.000**
.000**

R square = .028
Adjusted R Square = .027
Std. Error of the Estimate = 1.024
* p .05
** p .001
N = 4462

As the results in Table 4 demonstrate, there are two other variables in addition to
ideology that achieve statistical significance: the direction of the decision (conservative
or liberal) and the issue area. These results accord with previous findings suggesting
that the issue area is a legal factor that significantly influences justices‟ decisions to
overrule precedent (Banks 1999; Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Wahlbeck 1997). However,
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this variable is likely interacting with ideology, as conservatives and liberals are known
to be influenced by different issue areas (Hagle and Spaeth 1993; Lindquist and Cross
2009); for example, evidence demonstrates that liberals are more likely to vote in order
to expand civil rights whereas conservatives will vote to limit those rights. Both
coefficient estimates are negatively signed with very large t-statistics indicating that the
null hypothesis can be rejected.
This analysis would not be complete without a comparison of the ideologues
behavior with that of the non-ideologues. As such, Table 5 provides the results of the
regression analysis completed with all of the non-ideologues‟ votes for the period
examined.
In a comparison of the justices‟ mean rates of precedent conformance, it became
apparent that the non-ideologues had a higher rate of overruling precedents than the
ideologues. A comparison of the regression analyses shows that there are several
similarities between the two groups. One difference is that non-ideologues seem to
consider one legal factor that the ideologues do not as the direction of the lower court
decision reached statistical significance for the non-ideologues. Furthermore, the
direction of the decision does not reach statistically significant levels, possibly implying
that the ideological direction of the policy outcome is not as influential for the nonideologues as it is for the ideologue justices. Furthermore, ideology does not reach
statistically significant levels for the non-ideologues. The coefficient of the ideology
variable is also in the negative direction, but it is not nearly as strong of an influence for
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the non-ideologues as the ideologues. As such, other variables besides ideology are
the driving force behind non-ideologues likelihood of overruling precedent.
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Non-Ideologue Justices to Overrule Precedent
Variable

Constant
Justices‟
Ideology
Lower court‟s
decision
direction
Lower court
decision
Issue area
Direction of
the decision

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
2.204
.199
-.010
.021

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
-.053

t
11.077
-.473

Sig.
.000
.637

-.170

.079

-.088

-2.161

.031*

.006

.015

.014

.383

.702

-.041
-.128

.010
.077

-.155
-.067

-4.071
-1.665

.000**
.096

R square = .029
Adjusted R Square = .024
Std. Error of the Estimate = .940
* p .05
N=9659

Hence, we can discern that the ideologues and the non-ideologues differ in their
treatment of precedent in that ideology is a stronger influence for the ideologues in their
votes to overrule precedent, although the non-ideologues actually have slightly higher
rates of overruling precedent. These findings suggest that the non-ideologues may
consider some legal factors, such as the issue area and the lower court‟s decision,
while deciding to overrule precedent.
Logistic Regression analysis was estimated for the ideologue justices in order to
further examine the relationship between ideology and overruling precedent. The
results depict a negative relationship, as the odds ratio for the relationship between
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ideology and overruling precedent is .211. Using this odds ratio, it can be determined
that for every one-unit change in ideology using the Martin and Quinn (2002) scores
decreases the odds of overruling precedent by 78.9%. The results indicate that only
two independent variables achieve statistical significance: the decision direction (.050)
and the justices‟ ideology (.023). Nonetheless, adding all of the independent variables
improves the predictive power of the likelihood of overruling precedent. The chi-square
test statistic indicates that the extant model is an improvement on the MLE initial knownothing model, as the value is 125.274. This value, although not statistically significant
(.98), suggests that the independent variables improve our ability to predict the
likelihood of overruling precedent.
Table 6 Logistic Regression Analysis for Ideologue Justices
Model
Estimates
Constant
Ideology
Decision
Direction
Lower Court
Decision
Lower Court
Decision
Direction
Issue Area
Model
Summary
Chi-Square
Cox-Snell RSquare
Nagelkerke RSquare

Coefficient

Significance

1.253
8.784
1.331

.023
.050

1.280

.073

1.318

.089

1.533
Value

.139
Significance

125.274
.356

0.98

.422
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In reviewing the results for the ideology variable, it becomes apparent that a nonlinear relationship exists between the justice‟s ideology and the likelihood that the
justices vote to overrule precedent. In other words, it was hypothesized that the
likelihood of overruling precedent would increase for those justices who lie at the
extreme values along the ideological continuum. However, the results suggest that the
middle range of the ideology variable has the most contrast, as a one-unit change in
ideology can sway the justice to vote in order to uphold precedent or vote to overrule
precedent depending on his or her specific point along the ideological continuum.
The logistic regression estimate for the non-ideologue justices indicates that only
the lower court decision variable achieves statistical significance (.008). The
relationship between ideology and the likelihood of overruling precedent is quite difficult
to determine as there is great variance among the ideology values. As such, the results
from the logistic regression suggests that the relationship between ideology and the
likelihood of overruling precedent is non-linear, as there is not a uniform association for
predicting a change in ideology with the likelihood that precedent will or won‟t be
overruled. Ideology combined with the other independent variable provides a more
detailed picture for increasing the predictive power.
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CHAPTER FOUR: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES
Findings and Analysis
The second measure of judicial activism concerns the judicial review of federal
statutes. The Supreme Court established the power of judicial review in the landmark
case Marbury v. Madison (1803), creating the power to rule acts of Congress
unconstitutional. Although some may view this power as essential for maintaining the
balance of power among the three federal branches of the U.S. government, others
argue that it disrupts the delicate balance. “By voiding an act of the elected branches,
the Court arguably places itself in the position of disrupting the constitutional separation
of powers by assuming legislative power” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 47). As such, the
invalidation of federal legislation is considered the “benchmark measure” of judicial
activism (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 48).
Similar to the overruling of legal precedents, the invalidation of federal statutes is
a rare occurrence. The United States Supreme Court Database (Spaeth 2005) provides
data containing justices‟ votes in cases that ruled an act of Congress as
unconstitutional. For the purposes of this examination, only federal statutes were
considered, excluding cases pertaining to the invalidation of state, municipal and local
laws. During the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, an act of Congress was declared
unconstitutional on fifty-four (54) occasions. Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution
of these instances, as well as the total number of challenges.
As the findings demonstrate, the Burger Court (1969-1986) used the power of
judicial review quite sparingly. With the exception of five Court terms (1969, 1970,
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1972, 1975 and 1982), the justices voted to invalidate statutes at a rate of one or less
per term, despite the fact that there was a large amount of opportunities to do so.
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that 77.27% of these cases were decided in the
liberal direction. Furthermore, the majority of these cases concerned Civil Rights and
the First Amendment. Of the eight cases that the Burger Court justices ruled
unconstitutional pertaining to Civil Rights, each one was decided in the liberal direction.

Frequency Distribution Showing Number of Cases
Invalidating Federal Statutes by Court Term
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1976
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0

Court Term
Number of Federal Statutes Invalidated

Number of Challenges

Figure 1 Frequency Distribution of Federal Statutes Challenged and Invalidated by Court Term
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The Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) begins its tenure exhibiting quite restrainist
behavior. In fact, for the first eight years of Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s service, only three
acts of Congress were ruled unconstitutional. However, the next eight years
demonstrate a disproportionate amount of statutes that were invalidated by the
Court a total of 30. When considering the political environment of that time period,
these results seem to substantiate the findings of Harvey and Friedman (2006), who
provide evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court is influenced by Congress‟
ideological preferences. The majority of these rulings declaring Congressional acts
unconstitutional occurred when the Republican Party maintained control of Congress.
According to Harvey and Friedman, who examined the Rehnquist Court from 1987 to
2001, “The justices were less likely to hear cases involving constitutional challenges to
liberal statutes from 1987 to 1994, when the House and the Senate were under
Democratic control, than they were from 1995 to 2001, when Republicans had a
majority in both chambers” (2006). These findings indicate that the justices consider the
political environment and the ideological make-up of Congress. For example, their
reluctance to invalidate liberal statutes during a period of Democratic control of
Congress may be evidence of the court‟s concern for the public‟s preferences, lest it be
characterized as a countermajoritarian institution (Barnum 1985; Mishler and Sheehan
1993).
The issue of utmost concern during the Rehnquist Court was the First
Amendment as almost half (43.75%) of these federal statutes pertained to this
Constitutional right. Another 25% concerned federalism, not surprising considering the
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number of states‟ rights advocates on the Rehnquist Court. Perhaps most surprising is
that the majority (53.13%) of these rulings resulted in a liberal decision. However, when
the issues are considered in conjunction with the decision direction, the results are
similar to what would be expected from the Rehnquist Court: all (N=8) of the cases
concerning federalism were decided in the conservative direction, and almost all
(92.9%) of the First Amendment cases where decided in the liberal direction. The First
Amendment requires a strenuous test of strict scrutiny under which the Justices review
the law, making it a difficult task to limit the rights enumerated in the First Amendment.
Multivariate regression analysis was completed using justices‟ votes to invalidate
federal statutes as the dependent variable. Table 7 shows these results. Most
importantly, none of the independent variables reached the level of significance. Yet
interestingly, the coefficient for Congress‟ ideology indicates a substantial influence,
though it‟s statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the relationship between the
acting president‟s ideology and the justices‟ votes to invalidate statutes is inversely
related. The coefficient‟s value is -.025, suggesting that for every one-unit increase in
the acting president‟s ideology (as the president becomes more conservative) there is a
corresponding .025-unit decrease in the number of justices‟ votes to invalidate statutes,
although it too is not significant.
These findings may support those of previous studies (Harvey and Friedman
2006; 2008; Mishler and Sheehan 1993) that suggest that the justices‟ decision-making
is influenced by the ideological make-up of Congress. In this regression, Congress‟
ideology resulted in the largest coefficient value of all of the other independent
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variables. Similarly, Harvey and Friedman (2008, 3) found that “the likelihood that the
Rehnquist Court during its 1994-2001 terms would review a generic liberal statute
enacted between 1987 and 1994 increased by 123% as a result of the rightward
congressional turn of Congress after 1994, and by 500% for landmark liberal statutes.”
Mishler and Sheehan (1993, 97) found that “the ideological and partisan orientations of
the president and Congress are also important.”

Table 7: Regression Analysis of Ideologues’ Votes to Invalidate Statutes
Variable

Constant
Issue Area
Ideology Score
Divided/Unified
Gov‟t Dummy
Variable
President
Ideology
Congress‟
Ideology

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std.
Error
2.051
1.888
.001
.055
.049
.047
.213
4.231

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

-.025
3.613

t

Sig.

.005
.188
.080

1.086
.026
1.042
.050

.285
.979
.304
.960

4.427

-.009

-.006

.996

8.932

.107

.405

.688

R Square = .045
Adjusted R Square = -.091
Std. Error of the Estimate = 1.202
*p .05
N=3111

In reviewing the regression analysis of the non-ideologue justices‟ votes to
invalidate statutes, it is apparent that there are more similarities between the two groups
than there are differences. Table 8 shows these results. Again, none of the variables
reach levels of statistical significance. The coefficient estimate for Congress‟ ideology is
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not as strong for the non-ideologues as it was for the ideologues suggesting that the
Congress‟ influence is not as great for the non-ideologues. Perhaps the most
interesting difference between the two regression estimates is that the President‟s
ideology has reversed directions for the non-ideologues. Thus, for every one-unit
increase in the president‟s ideology (as the president becomes more conservative),
there is a corresponding increase in the justices‟ votes to invalidate statutes. Again, this
finding is not statistically significant.

Table 8 Regression Analysis of Non-Ideologues’ Votes to Invalidate Statutes
Variable

Constant
Issue Area
Ideology Score
Divided/Unified
Gov‟t Dummy
Variable
President
Ideology
Congress‟
Ideology

Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std.
Error
1.863
.199
-.019
.015
.025
.102
.178
3.959

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

.010
1.594

t

Sig.

-.062
-.012
.067

9.361
-1.267
-.239
.045

.000
.206
.811
.964

4.164

.004

.002

.998

2.777

.107

.409

.685

R Square = .004
Adjusted R Square = .000
Std. Error of the Estimate = 1.013
*p .05
N=6241
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Judicial activism has become the catch-all phrase for conservatives and liberals
alike for characterizing Supreme Court decisions that are disagreeable to one‟s own
policy preferences. Indeed, judicial scholars have provided substantial evidence to
suggest that justices make decisions in order to advance their own policy goals, yet the
justices must consider a number of constraints that limit their ability to achieve those
goals. Thus, while ideology is a significant predictor of judicial behavior, it is not the
only one. The findings of this research contribute to previous literature that suggests
that extra-attitudinal and legal factors act as constraints, limiting justices‟ votes to
overrule precedents and invalidate statutes within the context of the justices personal
preferences. The justices will temper their decisions and try to get as close as possible
to their ideal policy outcome while considering these constraints.
Perhaps Justice Souter‟s commencement address at Harvard University explains
the judicial decision-making process best when he described the “fair-reading model.”
In this sense, justices must make a decision among various competing values that have
been embedded in the Constitution and this does not constitute judicial activism, but is a
necessary element of interpreting the law. As Justice Souter so eloquently states,
“A choice may have to be made, not because language is
vague, but because the Constitution embodies the desire of
the American people, like most people, to have things both
ways. We want order and security, and we want liberty. And
we want not only liberty but equality as well. These paired
desires of ours can clash, and when they do a court is forced
to choose between them, between one constitutional good
and another one. The court has to decide which of our
approved desires has the better claim, right here, right now,
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and a court has to do more than read fairly when it makes this
kind of choice.”
Essentially, Justice Souter hints at a key element involved in the judicial decisionmaking process and that is the timing. Thus, legal change is connected to social
change, as the social context of the political environment and public preferences are all
considered when justices vote to overrule established precedents or invalidate federal
statutes (Rosenberg 2008). However, Justice Souter also implies the role of the
justices‟ personal preferences in that it is likely that a justice‟s ideology is a key factor
for choosing between one constitutional good and another.
This study sought to examine the Supreme Court as a political institution
comprised of political actors. As such, the focus of this research centered on the most
ideological leaning justices, theorizing that the ideologues would exhibit more
pronounced activist behavior. In general, ideologues in the masses have stronger
partisan leanings and are less likely to moderate their attitudes. It does not appear that
this is the case with the most ideological justices. Although ideology is indeed one of
the strongest influences over judicial decision-making, the justices who lie at the
ideological poles along the continuum appear more likely to moderate their votes than
hypothesized. Thus, the most ideological justices cannot be compared to the extremely
ideological politicians in that the justices are more likely to temper their votes, likely
because of institutional factors. The institutional legitimacy and prestige rely on the
public‟s perceptions of a neutral, unbiased Court. Whereas the public is willing to
accept extremely ideological politicians, it is not likely to be so accepting of justices who
brashly pronounce their policy preferences. Democratically-elected politicians are held
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accountable for their votes via reelection campaigns and responses from their
constituents, and they campaign by expressing their personal policy preferences in
order to identify with the public. Supreme Court justices, on the other hand, are
intended to moderate their votes according to the law and not ideology.
Future Research
The Court is a political institution, and should be understood as such. Political
scientists and judicial scholars have a ways to go in order to truly understand the
dynamic process of judicial decision-making. Furthermore, the Court is always
changing, as shifts in membership shape the agenda and voting coalitions. The
attitudinal model is accepted for its predictive power, but the model can be rigid and is
not always able to account for changing attitudes. As such, future research would
benefit by considering the context in which attitudes are formed, instead of ignoring the
influence of the political environment, legal factors and public preferences. “The
enormous controversy that resulted from the Warren Court‟s work, the survival and
acceptance of the fundamental doctrinal developments of the Warren Court era result
from its largely successful effort to accommodate a newly developing pattern of
pluralism in America” (Lindquist and Cross 2009, 145).
In the aftermath of Bush v. Gore, the public now views the Court as a political
institution, capable of rendering partisan rulings. Observers of the Court who criticize its
decisions as activist often cite to a so-called chilling effect on legislative action,
suggesting that Congress is limited in its legislative proposals out of fear of Supreme
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Court reversal. On the other hand, as Posner (2008) suggests, a trade off functions so
that Congress does not pass unconstitutional laws, and in return, the Supreme Court
does not behave overtly activist lest Congress limit the Court‟s jurisdiction.
Judicial activism might be better understood from several facets, not only in
cases that overrule precedent or invalidate statutes. Activism should be redefined so
that it characterizes judicial decision-making that is influenced by partisan preferences.
Future research could provide a better understanding of restrainist behavior that
actually should be considered activist in that it advances one‟s personal political goals.
All in all, the Court is a political institution and its actors have partisan interests despite
the black robes and air of objective decision-making.
A deeper understanding of the Court‟s agenda would likely lead to a more
complete understanding of the judicial decision-making process. Thus, future research
should focus on what influences are significant in shaping the Court‟s agenda and how
that, in turn, relates to judicial activism. Further research could potentially predict how
cases on the court‟s agenda will shape precedence conformance and votes to invalidate
statutes.
One other area of research that would be quite interesting to explore is that of the
presidential veto and its effect on the Court‟s rate of deference to federal statutes.
Some presidents may exercise the presidential veto power more often than others,
resulting in variation court terms‟ rates of statutory deference. For example, President
Clinton vetoed several abortion statutes during his two terms, essentially saving liberal
justices a vote that could have been characterized as activist. A comparison of
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presidential veto rates and justice rates to invalidate federal statutes could explain
another aspect of the separation-of-powers model and how that corresponds to judicial
behavior.
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APPENDIX A – CASE LIST
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Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF CASES THAT OVERRULED PRECEDENT ON
THE BURGER AND REHNQUIST COURTS (1969-2005)
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Number

Court

Case Name

Citation

Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks

398 U.S. 235

Term
1

1969

Union
2

1969

Maragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.

398 U.S. 375

3

1970

Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.

402 U.S. 313

University of Illinois
4

1970

Perez v. Campbell

402 U.S. 367

5

1970

Griffin v. Breckenridge

403 U.S. 88

6

1971

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee

406 U.S. 91

7

1971

Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville

406 U.S. 320

Railroad Co.
8

1972

Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts

410 U.S. 356

Co.
9

1972

Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of

410 U.S. 484

Kentucky
10

1972

Miller v. California

413 U.S. 15

11

1973

North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy

414 U.S. 156

v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc.
12

1973

Edelman v. Jordan

415 U.S. 15

13

1974

Taylor v. Louisiana

419 U.S. 522

14

1974

United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.,

421 U.S. 397

Inc.
15

1975

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages

423 U.S. 276

16

1975

Hudgens v. National Labor Relations

424 U.S. 507

Board
17

1975

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Consumer Council, Inc.
79

425 U.S. 748

18

1975

National League of Cities v. Usery

426 U.S. 833

19

1975

Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment

427 U.S. 132

Relations Commission
20

1975

Gregg v. Georgia

428 U.S. 153

21

1976

Craig v. Boren

429 U.S. 190

22

1976

Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.

429 U.S. 190

23

1976

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady

429 U.S. 363

24

1976

Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylania, Inc.

433 U.S. 36

25

1976

Shaffer v. Heitner

433 U.S. 186

26

1977

Department of Revenue of Washington

435 U.S. 734

v. Association of Washington Steve
Doring Companies
27

1977

Monell v. Department of Social

436 U.S. 658

Services
28

1977

Burks v. United States

437 U.S. 1

29

1977

United States v. Scott

437 U.S. 82

30

1978

Hughes v. Oklahoma

441 U.S. 322

31

1979

Trammel v. United States

445 U.S. 40

32

1979

United States v. Salvucci

448 U.S. 83

33

1979

Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.

448 U.S. 261

34

1980

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana

453 U.S. 609

35

1981

United States v. Ross

456 U.S. 798

36

1982

Illinois v. Gates

462 U.S. 213

37

1982

Michigan v. Long

463 U.S. 1032

38

1983

United States v. One Assortment of 89

465 U.S. 354

Firearms
39

1983

Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co.

465 U.S. 354

40

1983

Copperweld Corp v. Independence

467 U.S. 752

Tube Corp.
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41

1984

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan

469 U.S. 528

Transit Authority
42

1984

United States v. Miller

471 U.S. 130

43

1985

Daniels v. Williams

474 U.S. 327

44

1985

Batson v. Kentucky

476 U.S. 79

45

1985

Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New

476 U.S. 573

York State Liquor Authority
46

1985

Rose v. Clark

478 U.S. 570

47

1986

Griffith v. Kentucky

479 U.S. 314

48

1986

Puerto Rico v. Branstad

483 U.S. 219

49

1986

Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v.

483 U.S. 232

Washington State Department
50

1986

American Trucking Associates, Inc. v.

483 U.S. 266

Scheiner
51

1986

Solorio v. United States

483 U.S. 435

52

1986

Welch v. Texas Department of

483 U.S. 468

Highways and Public Transportation
53

1987

Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.

485 U.S. 271

Mayacamas Corp.
54

1987

South Carolina v. Baker

485 U.S. 505

55

1988

Thornburgh v. Abbott

490 U.S. 401

56

1988

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson

490 U.S. 477

American Express, Inc.
57

1988

Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.

490 U.S. 642

Antonio
58

1988

Alabama v. Smith

490 U.S. 794

59

1988

Healy v. The Beer Institute

491 U.S. 324

60

1988

Webster v. Reproductive Health

492 U.S. 490

61

1989

Collins v. Youngblood

497 U.S. 37
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1990

Shirley v. Department of Veteran

498 U.S. 89

Affairs
63

1990

California v. Charles Steven Acevedo

500 U.S. 565

64

1990

Exxon v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.

500 U.S. 603

65

1990

Coleman v. Thompson

501 U.S. 722

66

1990

Payne v. Tennessee

501 U.S. 808

67

1991

Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes

504 U.S. 1

68

1991

Planned Parenthood v. Casey

505 U.S. 833

69

1992

Harper v. Virginia Department of

509 U.S. 86

Taxation
70

1993

Nichols v. United States

511 U.S. 738

71

1993

Department of Labor v. Greenwich

512 U.S. 267

Collieries
72

1994

Hubbard v. United States

514 U.S. 695

73

1994

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico

515 U.S. 200

Pena
74

1994

United States v. Gaudin

515 U.S. 506

75

1995

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida

517 U.S. 44

76

1995

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island

517 U.S. 484

77

1995

Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance

517 U.S. 706

Company
78

1995

Lewis v. Casey

518 U.S. 343

79

1997

State oil Company v. Barkat

522 U.S. 3

80

1997

Hudson v. United States

524 U.S. 236

81

1997

Hohn v. United States

527 U.S. 666

82

1998

College Savings Bank v. Florida

527 U.S. 666

Prepaid
83

1999

Guy Mitchell v. Helms

530 U.S. 793

84

2000

U.S. v. Hatter

532 U.S. 557

82

85

2001

Lapides v. Board of Regents

535 U.S. 613

86

2001

U.S. v. Cotton

535 U.S. 625

87

2001

Atkins v. Virginia

536 U.S. 304

88

2002

Lawrence v. Texas

539 U.S. 558

89

2003

Crawford v. Washington

541 U.S. 36

90

2003

Vieth v. Jubelirer

541 U.S. 267

91

2004

Roper v. Simmons

543 U.S. 551
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Number

Court Term

Case Name

Citation

1

1969

Turner v. United States

396 U.S. 398

2

1969

Schacht v. United States

398 U.S. 58

3

1970

Oregon v. Mitchell

400 U.S. 112

4

1970

Blount v. Rizzi

400 U.S. 410

5

1970

Tilton et al. v. Richardson

403 U.S. 672

6

1972

Frontierto v. Richardson

411 U.S. 677

7

1972

U.S. Dept of Agriculture v. Murry

413 U.S. 508

8

1972

U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v.

413 U.S. 528

Moreno
9

1973

Jimenez v. Weinberger

417 U.S. 628

10

1974

Weinberger v. Wisenfeld

420 U.S. 636

11

1975

Buckley v. Valeo

424 U.S. 1

12

1975

National League of Cities v.

426 U.S. 833

Usery
13

1976

Califano v. Goldfarb

430 U.S. 199

14

1977

Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.

436 U.S. 307

15

1978

Califano v. Westcott

443 U.S. 76

16

1981

Northern Pipeline Construction v.

458 U.S. 50

Marathon Pipeline Co.
17

1982

United States v. Grace

461 U.S. 171

18

1982

INS v. Chadha

462 U.S. 919

19

1982

Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products

463 U.S. 60

Corp.
20

1983

FCC v. League of Women Voters

468 U.S. 364

of California
21

1984

FEC v. National Conservative
85

470 U.S. 480

Political Action Committee et al.
22

1985

Bowsher v. Synar

478 U.S. 714

23

1986

FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens

479 U.S. 238

for Life
24

1987

Boos, Waller and Brooker v. Barry

485 U.S. 312

25

1989

United States v. Eichman

496 U.S. 310

26

1994

United States v. National

514 U.S. 454

Treasury Employees Union
27

1994

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,

514 U.S. 211

28

1994

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Company

514 U.S. 476

29

1994

United States v. Lopez

514 U.S. 549

30

1995

Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

517 U.S. 44

Florida
31

1995

United States v IBM Corp.

517 U.S. 843

32

1995

Colorado Republican Federal

518 U.S. 604

Campaign Committee v. FEC
33

1996

Babbitt v. Youpee

519 U.S. 234

34

1996

City of Boerne v. Flores

521 U.S. 507

35

1996

Reno v. ACLU

521 U.S. 844

36

1996

Printz v. United States

521 U.S. 898

37

1997

United States v. United States

523 U.S. 360

Shoe Corporation
38

1997

United States v. Hosep Krikor

524 U.S. 321

Bajakajian
39

1997

Clinton v. City of New York

524 U.S. 417

40

1997

Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel

524 U.S. 498

41

1998

Greater New Orleans

527 U.S. 173

Broadcasting Assoc., Inc. v.
United States
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42

1998

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary

527 U.S. 627

Education Expense, Inc., v.
College Savings Bank and United
States
43

1998

College Savings Bank v. Florida

527 U.S. 666

Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense, Inc.
44

1999

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents

528 U.S. 62

45

1999

United States v. Morrison

529 U.S. 598

46

1999

United States v. Playboy

529 U.S. 803

Enterprises Group, Inc.
47

1999

Dickerson v United States

530 U.S. 428

48

2000

Board of Trustees of the

531 U.S. 356

University of Alabama v. Garrett
49

2000

Legal Services Corporation v.

531 U.S. 533

Carmen Velazquez
50

2000

U.S. v. Hatter

532 U.S. 557

51

2000

United States and Dept. of

533 U.S. 405

Agriculture v. United Foods, Inc.
52

2001

Ashcroft v. The Free Speech

535 U.S. 234

Coalition
53

2001

Thompson v. Western States

535 U.S. 357

Medical Center
54

2004

United States v. Booker
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543 U.S. 220
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END NOTES
i

381 U.S. 479 (1965).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
iii
There is actually an argument as to whether or not Brown v. Board of Education
overturned the precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson. The argument has been made
that Brown did not directly overturn the precedent in Plessy, but rather distinguished it
and struck down the “separate but equal” clause.
iv
EXPLAIN FURTHER
v
See, e.g., the economist, Paul Samuelson.
vi
EXPLAIN PER CURIAM AND MEMOS.
vii
Lindquist and Cross (2009, 62-63) organize the justices who were members of the
Supreme Court between 1954 – 2004 into four categories associated with high and low
institutional activism (defined as, “reflects the justice‟s propensity to defer to the
coordinate branches or to exercise judicial power to enforce the constitution, regardless
of the ideology of the underlying statute”) and high and low ideological activism
(defined as, “the propensity to strike federal legislation that is contrary to the justice‟s
ideology but a high propensity to uphold statutes that are ideologically aligned with the
justice‟s preferences”). They find that the following Justices exhibit both high
institutional and ideological activism: Marshall, Brennan, Thomas, Scalia, Souter,
O‟Connor, Douglas and Black. The Justices who exhibit low institutional and ideological
activism are: Blackmun, Breyer, White, Powell, Stewart, Frankfurter and Harlan. The
Justice who exhibits high institutional activism and low ideological activism is Kennedy,
and the Justices who exhibit high ideological activism and low institutional activism are:
Burger, Rehnquist, Ginsburg, Stevens, Clark and Warren.
viii
Video game laws have been overruled in the following states and municipalities:
California, Illinois, Indianapolis, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota Oklahoma, St. Louis,
and Washington. For more information, please visit:
http://www.theesa.com/policy/legalissues.asp.
ix
Schwarzenegger v. EMA/Entertainment Software Association.
x
For the purposes of this research, the justices‟ ideology will be measured using the
Segal and Cover (1989) ideology scores, discussed in the next chapter.
xi
The six Justices who have been identified as the ideologues for the purpose of this
study are: Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, Rehnquist, Stevens and Thomas.
xii
Justices Douglas and Black were excluded from this analysis as their voting records
were not available for analysis with the U.S. Supreme Court Database.
ii
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